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Abstract
There has been a growing debate on big data and analytics in recent
years. Applying analytics to big data creates many opportunities for
managers and policy makers to gain greater insight into their business so
that they can improve their decision-making. This thesis employs novel
approaches of data science to study economic and managerial topics. In
particular, we combine the traditional econometric models with novel
network measures and machine learning algorithms in exploring the big
and high dimensional data of global inter-firm ownership network and
Chinese C2C sellers’ microblogs in social media, so as to provide man-
agerial strategies for both firm-level and individual business.
The first two studies investigate inter-firm ownership network and
firm performance. By analysing the data of Italian firms in the period of
debt crisis, the first study provides a deep insight into the relationship
between firm performance and the interaction of firm-level centrality
and business group size. The findings, together with the novel centrality
measure we provide, contribute to the literature on inter-firm ownership
network. The second study explores foreign ownership and firm per-
formance from various perspectives. The results reveal that the foreign-
owned Italian firms are on average more productive than the ones in
domestic-owned MNEs. In addition, we find that the Italian subsidiary
with shorter organizational and geographical distance from their foreign
owners are on average more productive.
The third study focuses on business in social media. By exploiting
the fact that Sina Weibo collaborates with Taobao (Chinas largest C2C e-
commerce platform) to provide their sellers an easier way to promote
their products using microblogs, we are able to examine the relation-
ship between marketing aggressiveness and marketing popularity. In-
terestingly, we identify an optimal level of how aggressive Taobao sellers
should be when promoting their products over Sina Weibo. This finding
contributes to the existing literature on social media marketing, espe-
cially in the field of C2C business.
xx
Chapter 1
Introduction
The thesis employs the econometric models, network measures and
machine learning algorithms in exploring the big and high dimensional
data of global inter-firm ownership network and Chinese online sellers’
microblogs in social media. We attempt to provide managerial strategies
for both firm-level and individual business for the purpose of improving
their performance.
The first two chapters focus on inter-firm ownership network of busi-
ness groups. Through ownership links, firms can exchange financial
capital, superior knowledge and managerial skills with other firms in
the same group (Arnold and Javorcik, 2005; Markusen, 1995). However,
some studies argue that a business group with diversified subsidiaries
may have problems due to weak disclosure requirements, ineffective
governance mechanisms, and a poorly developed market for corporate
control (Khanna and Palepu, 2000; La Porta et al., 1997, 1998). In the liter-
ature, although the role of individual firm position in the inter-firm net-
work and the group-level features on firm performance has been widely
discussed, the effect of their interaction has drawn less attention.
In Chapter 2, we attempt to fill this gap by combining the firm-level
centrality and business group size and exploring the relationship be-
tween their interaction and firm performance. Furthermore, we provide
a novel centrality measure based on the harmonic centrality (Newman,
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2003; Rochat, 2009; Schilling and Phelps, 2007). Our measure solves the
problem of high correlation between centrality and component size using
a normalization approach and make the centrality measure more com-
parable across components, which in our case are business groups com-
posed of different numbers of subsidiaries.
Through an empirical investigation of the performance of 483,835
Italian firms during the debt crisis from 2011 to 2014, we find a positive
relationship between firm centrality and performance in small business
groups, but not always significantly positive in large groups. What’s
more, we find that there exists a positive relationship between firm per-
formance and group size for the peripheral subsidiaries, and the group
size ”premium” for them is larger than for the central ones.
In Chapter 3 we discuss the foreign ownership and firm performance
using the same data as in Chapter 2. Based on the location of the ulti-
mate owner, firms involved in a MNE in a certain country can be gen-
erally divided into two types: foreign-owned subsidiaries and firms in
a domestic-owned MNE. There has been a fruitful discussion on the ad-
vantages of MNEs, such as the spillover effect (Bernstein and Mohnen,
1998; Blomstro¨m and Sjo¨holm, 1999), economies of scale (Dunning, 1989;
Lovelock and Yip, 1996), and tax reasons (Desai et al., 2004, 2006; UNC-
TAD, 2015), and consequently, MNEs are proved to have better perfor-
mance than the domestic groups in many empirical studies. Then we
focus on the different types of foreign-owned subsidiaries by consider-
ing the location of their direct owners and ultimate owners. UNCTAD
(2016) point out that 41% of the foreign affiliates all over the world are
owned by direct owners and ultimate owners in different countries.
By analysing the balance sheet data of 564,770 Italian firms, we empir-
ically find that the firms making up part of a multinational group outper-
form the purely domestic groups. Moreover, among the multinational
firms, the foreign-owned Italian firms are on average more productive
than the ones in domestic-owned MNEs. Interestingly, we find that the
Italian subsidiaries with shorter organizational or geographical distance
from their foreign owners are on average more productive. In addition,
subsidiaries with multiple cross-border links in the upstream ownership
2
chain are found to be more productive.
Chapter 4 studies the individual online business and their marketing
behaviour on social media. Social media has become a widely used mar-
keting tool for reaching potential customers. Because of its low cost, so-
cial media marketing is especially appealing to the customer-to-customer
(C2C) sellers. Customers can also benefit from social media marketing
by learning about products and by interacting with sellers in real time.
However, if a seller is too aggressive in promoting her products, cus-
tomers may get annoyed. Previous literature has mainly focused on the
gratification brought by social media (Kaplan and Haenlein, 2010; Man-
gold and Faulds, 2009). Although some works have pointed out people’s
negative attitude towards aggressive social media (and online) market-
ing by making surveys (Akar and Topc¸u, 2011; Grant, 2005), to the best of
our knowledge, no one has empirically provided an optimal marketing
aggressiveness level in social media. This paper attempts to fill the gap
by analysing the data of Taobao (China’s largest C2C e-commerce plat-
form, similar to eBay and Amazon) sellers on Sina Weibo (China’s largest
microblogging platform). Moreover, our research contributes to the liter-
ature on C2C sellers’ behaviour in social media by solving the technical
problems of identifying the individual sellers and collecting their data.
We identify the 52,187 Taobao sellers on Sina Weibo and collect their
microblogs in November 2014. For the 12,744 sellers who add the links of
their Taobao shop, we further track their microblogs from July to October
in 2016. We define the marketing aggressiveness level as the proportion
of a seller’s marketing-related microblogs and define the marketing pop-
ularity as the average number of likes a seller receives per marketing-
related microblog. To classify the microblogs into marketing-related and
non-marketing ones, we train different machine learning classifiers, such
as decision trees, logistic regression, multinomial naive bayes, and ran-
dom forest with a manually labelled sample of 5,000 microblogs. The
multinomial naive bayes algorithm has the best performance with a ROC
score of 0.96 and is used to classify all the microblogs. In modelling
the relationship between marketing aggressiveness level and marketing
popularity, the linear regression using Yeo-Johnson transformation for
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the number of followers outperforms the other models such as random
forest and neural network. After multiple statistical tests, we empirically
confirm that there is an inverted U-shape relationship between the mar-
keting aggressiveness level and the marketing popularity. Specifically,
the optimal proportion of marketing microblogs is around 0.3. More-
over, we find a saturation effect of the number of followers on marketing
popularity after it reaches around 100,000.
All in all we investigate how the role, position and strategy of firms
in business networks impact on their performance. The dissertation is
made of two parts. In Chapters 2 and 3 we explore inter-firm ownership
network and firm performance. In Chapter 4 we focus on business in
social media.
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Chapter 2
The Effect of Firm
Centrality and Business
Group Size on Firm
Performance: Evidence
from Italy
2.1 Introduction
In an interorganizational network, units can acquire a variety of re-
sources and information by connecting with other units. The ability to
access the resources and information highly depends on their network
positions. A unit occupying a central position in the network is likely to
have more opportunities to access resources and information and benefit
from the knowledge spillover effects (Powell et al., 1999; Tsai, 2001; Tsai
and Ghoshal, 1998; Zaheer and Bell, 2005). However, units at central po-
sitions incur more costs to maintain the relational ties. Furthermore, a
high level of connectivity is sometimes considered to derail economic
performance by making firms vulnerable to exogenous shocks (Uzzi,
1996, 1997).
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The work discusses the ownership network of business groups, which
are defined as confederations of legally independent firms linked by mul-
tiplex ties (Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2006; Belenzon and Berkovitz, 2010;
Belenzon et al., 2013) and belonging to the same owner(s) (Belenzon
et al., 2017; Cainelli and Iacobucci, 2011; Cainelli et al., 2006). Firms
can exchange financial capital, superior knowledge and managerial skills
with other firms in the same group through ownership links (Blomstro¨m
and Sjo¨holm, 1999; Markusen, 1995). But some studies argue that a busi-
ness group with diversified affiliates may have problems due to weak
disclosure requirements, ineffective governance mechanisms, and a poo-
rly developed market for corporate control (Khanna and Palepu, 2000;
La Porta et al., 1997, 1998).
In literature, the role of individual positions in the inter-firm net-
work and the group-level features has been widely discussed, but the
relationship between their interaction and firm performance is underex-
plored. Though a central firm in large groups can gain more access to
information, it is possibly faced with higher costs of acquiring and com-
municating knowledge (Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg, 2012) and gov-
ernance frictions which can reduce the effectiveness of central control
(Bethel and Liebeskind, 1998; Patacconi, 2009). The possible trade-off ef-
fect may make central firms in a large business group benefit less than
expected.
Through an empirical analysis, our research contributes to the exist-
ing studies by combining the firm-level centrality and business group
size and exploring the relationship between their interaction and firm
performance. Furthermore, we provide a novel centrality measure to
evaluate a firm’s position in the ownership network. The measure is
based on the harmonic centrality (Newman, 2003; Rochat, 2009; Schilling
and Phelps, 2007), which can avoid the infinite path length problem in
a network composed of disconnected components. However, the har-
monic centrality value of a certain node is highly correlated with the
component size where it is located. Given this drawback, our measure
adopts a normalization method to reduce the effect of the component
size. In this way, we make the centrality measure more comparable
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across components.
Our analysis is focused on Italian firms. Italy and some other Eu-
ropean countries have experienced a severe debt crisis since the end of
2009. The real GDP growth rate of Italy1 had been ranked in the last 5
of the EU countries for 3 consecutive years since 2012. From Figure 1 we
can find that the economy of Italy was shocked by the crisis since 2011,
and the GDP growth rate turned positive again in 2014. During the cri-
sis, the skepticism about the availability of equity capital, as one of the
main determinants, results in the decrease in the volume of mergers and
acquisitions at the global level (Kostic´, 2013), and the ownership struc-
ture of most business groups remains stable. It would be prominent to
study the network features of the subsidiaries that are more resilient to
the exogenous financial shock through an analysis of their performance
in the crisis.
Another reason to study Italian firms is that business group, espe-
cially controlled by a person or a group of family members, is a common
case in Italy (Corbetta and Tomaselli, 1996; Cucculelli and Micucci, 2008).
In 2014, the number of the Italian-owned business groups is ranked in the
top 10 countries all over the world. What’s more, the available databases
provide a better coverage for firms in the developed countries and the
data quality is also higher than that in the developing world. In sum-
mary, we believe that Italy is a representative country to conduct our
research.
We manually download the shareholders’ data of 17.8 million global
firms in 2014 from ORBIS database. Based on their direct inter-firm share-
holding relationships, we construct the global ownership network. Then
we restrict our sample to the Italian firms and identify 483,835 Italian
firms from the global ownership network and collect their financial ac-
counts data from 2011 to 2014 in AIDA (Analisi informatizzata delle
aziende italiane), which is the Italian subset of ORBIS. Then we empiri-
cally analyse firm centrality, business group size and the relationship be-
tween their interaction and firm performance, which is measured as the
3-year average sales growth rate. The results show a positive relation-
1Data source: world bank https://data.worldbank.org/.
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Figure 1: Real GDP Growth Rate of Some European Countries
ship between firm centrality and performance in small business groups,
but not always in larger business groups. Moreover, we find that for the
peripheral Italian subsidiaries, their performance is positively correlated
with the size of the group they belong to. Interestingly, the group size
”premium” for the peripheral ones is larger than for the central ones. A
possible explanation for the findings is that though firms at central po-
sitions in larger business groups can facilitate the access to funds and
information, they are also faced with higher coordination costs than in
small groups. But for firms at a peripheral position in larger groups, the
benefit of the reputation effect and the availability to diverse resources
can be much larger than that in small groups. Especially during the cri-
sis, being a member of a large business group makes them more resilient
to the exogenous financial shocks than in small groups.
The remainder of the Chapter is structured as follows. In Section 2.2
we present the theoretical framework of our research. Then Section 2.3
introduces the sample, centrality and business group size measure and
the econometric specifications. In section 2.4 we present some descrip-
tive statistics of the data and then provide the estimation results and
analysis. Finally, Section 2.5 concludes the work.
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2.2 Theoretical Framework
In the organizational network theory, a vast literature has investi-
gated the effect of unit position and network complexity on unit per-
formance, especially in the context of inter-firm network (Schilling and
Phelps, 2007; Zaheer and Bell, 2005). In an inter-firm network, firms
are connected through a variety of relationships such as collaboration
(Ahuja, 2000; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; Gulati et al., 2000), interlocking
directorates (Uzzi, 1997; Zaheer and Bell, 2005), ownership (Almeida and
Wolfenzon, 2006; Kali and Sarkar, 2011) and credit (Peterson and Rajan,
1994).
Our work is related to the literature on business groups’ ownership
network and firm performance. Business groups exhibit approximately a
pyramidal structure, in which one or more layers of firms are controlled
by the same ultimate owner, either directly or through a holding com-
pany (Cainelli and Iacobucci, 2011; Goto, 1982). Due to the availability of
worldwide shareholding data in recent years, a growing body of research
has explored the global ownership network (Glattfelder, 2010; Vitali and
Battiston, 2011; Vitali et al., 2011). The existing studies discuss the inter-
firm network generally from two perspectives: the individual firm level
and the network level (Provan et al., 2007). Though some works have
considered the factors of both levels, the relationship between their in-
terplay and firm performance remains unclear. Our research attempts
to fill the gap by combining both the individual level and network level
factors in the analysis.
2.2.1 Firm-level Centrality
A large number of studies have discussed the benefits of network cen-
trality for a firm. Since network links facilitate the sharing of financial
capital (Belenzon and Berkovitz, 2010), superior knowledge and man-
agerial skills (Bernstein and Mohnen, 1998; Markusen, 1995) among firms
in the business group, a firm occupying a central position in the network
has more opportunities to access diversified knowledge and resources
(Powell et al., 1996; Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998) and generate more inno-
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vations than the peripheral firms (Owen-Smith and Powell, 2004; Soh,
2003). However, despite the benefits of network ties, a high level of con-
nectivity is sometimes considered to constrain the adaptability of firms
and make them vulnerable to exogenous shocks (Uzzi, 1996, 1997).
In literature, diverse measures are used to identify a firm’s network
position. Gulati and Gargiulo (1999) and Powell et al. (1996) have used
closeness centrality, which measures how central a firm is relative to
other firms, including both direct and indirect partners. It also mea-
sures the firm’s reachability to every other firm with the fewest number
of intermediate firms. Schilling and Phelps (2007) employ the between-
ness centrality measure as a control variable but its effect on subsequent
firm patenting fails to achieve statistical significance in any of the esti-
mated models. Mani and Moody (2014) measure a firm’s position using
mesolevel network structure indicators: disconnected periphery, isolated
cluster, small world and nested world. They find that firms residing in
the nested core have more multiplex ties and larger transaction volumes
compared with firms in the small world or the disconnected periphery. A
recent work by Kwon et al. (2016) also adopts the closeness centrality to
measure how closely connected a firm is to the rest of the organizations
in the inter-firm network, but they haven’t found evidence to support
that the influence of national trust on alliance governance will decrease
as a firm increases its centrality in the international alliance network.
Our research contributes to the literature by providing a novel cen-
trality measure, which is based on the harmonic closeness centrality (Ne-
wman, 2003; Rochat, 2009). One advantage of the harmonic centrality is
that it can avoid the infinite path length problem compared with the tra-
ditional closeness centrality. However, the harmonic centrality value of
a node is highly correlated with the size of the component where it is lo-
cated. Given this drawback, our measure adopts a normalization method
to reduce the effect of the component size. By doing so, we make the cen-
trality measure more comparable across components of different sizes. In
the case of ownership network, we can better assess how central a firm
is in a business group of any size.
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2.2.2 Group-level Measures
A strand of literature focuses on the network-level features and tries
to understand the impact of the structures and behaviours on individ-
ual organizations (Ahuja, 2000; Powell et al., 1996; Provan et al., 2007).
Some recent works have developed novel measures to characterize the
complexity of a business group’s hierarchical structure. Altomonte and
Rungi (2013) provide a specific entropy-like measure of organizational
complexity of hierarchical chains and find a non-linear relationship be-
tween hierarchical complexity and productivity. Belenzon et al. (2013)
develop a pyramidal index that measures the distribution of firms by
ownership layers. They find that Anglo groups have the most vertical
hierarchical structure while the Swiss groups have the most horizontal
structures. Mahmood et al. (2017) adopt the intergroup network cen-
tralization measure introduced in Freeman (1978) and demonstrate that
centralization of equity ties enhances subsidiary performance, but such
effects weaken when the environment becomes turbulent.
The existing studies have emphasized the role of individual positions
in the network and the group-level features on firm performance, but
the relationship between their interaction and firm performance remains
unclear. Though a central firm in a large business group can gain more
access to information, it has to face possibly higher costs of acquiring
and communicating knowledge (Altomonte and Rungi, 2013; Caliendo
and Rossi-Hansberg, 2012) and governance frictions which can reduce
the effectiveness of central control (Bethel and Liebeskind, 1998; Patac-
coni, 2009). The possible trade-off effect may make a central firm in a
large business group benefit less than expected. On the contrary, periph-
eral subsidiaries in larger groups may not only enjoy the reputation effect
(Chang and Hong, 2000) but also be more resilient to the exogenous fi-
nancial shocks compared with in small groups. We conjecture that the
advantages of being involved in a large business group for a peripheral
subsidiary are bigger than for a central one.
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2.3 Method
2.3.1 Data and Sample
We derive the ownership data from Bureau van Dijk’s (BvD) ORBIS
database. ORBIS is the largest and most widely used database, which
captures information on companies, especially the private ones, from a
wide range of sources. ORBIS database covers information on 17,842,618
global firms’ equity ownership structure in 2014.2 For each firm, there is
at least one observation of its direct shareholders, and we collect each of
its owners’ ID 3 and the ownership shares (see the details of the data form
in Table 1). Firms can have multiple direct shareholders, such as firm E
and H in Table 1. In total, there are initially 25,635,140 observations and
each firm has on average 1.44 direct shareholders.
Table 1: Example of the Data
mark firm direct owner ownership shares
1 B A 100%
2 C B 100%
3 D A 97%
4 E A 79.35%
5 E K 20.65%
6 F E 95%
7 G F 100%
8 H F 90%
9 H L 10%
10 I H 100%
11 J A 100%
A strand of studies build the inter-firm ownership network based on
the majority rule (Altomonte and Rungi, 2013; Belenzon and Berkovitz,
2010; UNCTAD, 2016). In ORBIS, 81.2% of the firms are owned by ma-
2We download the data of all the firms provided with ownership information by ORBIS
in January 2015.
3BvD identifies each company by a unique ID. The BvD ID number incorporates either
the national ID number or the ID provided by their information providers (IP). According
to BvD, the ID numbers may change when the national ID numbers change in the official
data sources or the BvD IPs decide to switch their ID numbers. In Italy, the BvD ID may
change if the company changes address.
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jority shareholders. Their ownership links (shares > 50%), representing
56.53% of all the links (see Table 2), are used to build the ownership net-
work in our study.4 For example, the 5th and 9th row in Table 2 are
dropped. For each observation, we construct a directed link from the
shareholder to the firm. As illustrated in Figure 2, a directed link starting
from shareholder A to firm B is built for the first observation, and then
another link from shareholder B to firm C is built for the second obser-
vation, and so on. Some firms in the same business group may share
the same direct owner. For example, firms B, D, E, J are all owned by
firm A in the business group. All firms that belong to the same business
group are thus connected through ownership links. As shown in Figure
2, firm A is the parent firm of the business group and controls all the
other subsidiaries, and the ownership structure of each business group
can be depicted as a pyramid.5 Since there is no ownership link among
firms in different business groups, the global network can be divided
into disconnected components.6
According to the approach we use in building the ownership net-
work, each firm has 1 shareholder except that the ultimate owner has no
shareholder. Thus, the number of entities in each business group is equal
to the number of links plus 1, and the number of nodes in the global
ownership network is equal to the number of links plus the number of
components. For example, the business group in Figure 2 contains 10
firms and 9 ownership links. The global ownership network consists of
4We also use other two methods to build the ownership network in which the minority
control is considered. If a firm has no majority owner, we rank all its shareholders by their
shares r1, r2, r3, · · · . In one method, we retain the link from the top ranking shareholder
if its share is larger than the sum of the shares of the second and the third ranking share-
holders, that is, r1 > r2 + r3. Similarly, in the other method, we retain the link from the
top ranking shareholder if its share is larger than the sum of the shares of the second, the
third and the fourth shareholders, that is, r1 > r2 + r3 + r4.
5Due to the restriction of the data, we cannot distinguish the ownership by entities,
states, individuals or families. Therefore, the one locates at the top of each corporate own-
ership structure can be either a parent company whose shareholders are not provided by
ORBIS or all have minority ownership, or the individual who is the ultimate beneficial
owner of the business group. See more details in 2.6.6.
6Since the individual majority shareholders cannot be identified in the data, some
groups of size 2 mentioned in the main text of this chapter are actually composed of a
standalone firm and its individual shareholder. We perform a new algorithm to filter out
these possible links. See more details in 2.6.6.
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Table 2: Distribution of Direct Ownership Share
ownership share frequency percentage
(0, 25%] 3,997,584 15.59%
(25%, 50%] 7,144,627 27.87%
(50%, 75%] 3,615,425 14.10%
(75%, 100%] 10,877,504 42.43%
Total 25,635,140 100.00%
Figure 2: An Italian Business Group’s Ownership Structure
25,681,483 nodes, 14,492,929 links and 11,188,554 components.7 96.32%
of the components contain less than 4 nodes while only 0.05% of them
contain more than 50 nodes. The largest component is composed of 8,419
nodes.
As aforementioned, we then restrict our sample to the Italian firms.
In our data, Italian-owned business groups represent 3.46% of all the
business groups, ranking 8th among all countries.8 We collect the non-
7The network built by using the other two methods is composed of respectively
26,266,255 nodes, 14,873,254 links for the definition r1 > r2 + r3, and 26,168,532 nodes,
14,814,218 links for the definition r1 > r2 + r3 + r4.
8In our data, the 10 most frequent countries where the ultimate owners of all the busi-
ness groups are located include: United States (12.34%), Russia (9.43%), Norway (4.96%),
Poland (4.90%), Australia (4.88%), Germany (4.71%), Bulgaria (4.25%), Italy (3.46%), Roma-
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consolidated financial balance sheets data of Italian firms from AIDA,
which is also a product of Bureau van Dijk. It contains information on
all Italian companies obliged to deposit the balance sheet. We extract the
data of 1,164,871 active Italian firms in all sectors and regions in 2014.9
Among all these Italian firms provided by AIDA in 2014, we identify
483,835 of them in the global ownership network, which is built using the
data of ORBIS10. These Italian firms belong to 372,109 components. Each
of them contains at least one Italian firm and some of them also contain
foreign firms. 25 of these groups are composed of more than 1,000 firms
(see an example in Figure 3) and the largest one contains 3,260 firms.
2.3.2 Variables
Dependent Variable
Sales growth is a widely used indicator of firm performance (Brush
et al., 2000; Collins and Clark, 2003), which reflects how well an organi-
zation relates to the environment by successfully expanding their market
scope (Ansoff, 1965; Dess and Robinson, 1984; Hofer and Schendel, 1978).
We use the 3-year average sales growth rate as the dependent variable.
As a robustness check, we also use the logarithm forms of labour pro-
ductivity (see the definition in Table 12 in Appendix 2.6) and sales per
employee as the dependent variable.
Independent Variables
Firm Centrality
nia (2.50%) and Spain (1.51%).
9In February 2016, we download the Italian firms’ balance sheet data of the year 2014.
In June 2017, we further download their balance sheet data of the years 2011-2013 but some
firms are no longer found in AIDA. See the descriptive statistics in Table 3.
10We first match the Italian firms in AIDA with those in the original ORBIS ownership
databases by their BvD ID and identify 711,393 firms. Considering that some of them may
change the BvD ID number, we further match the rest firms by their names and identify
7,751 firms. In total, we find 719,144 Italian firms with ownership information in AIDA.
However, 235,309 of them have no majority owners. According to our definition, we cannot
identify which business group these firms belong to. Finally, we retain 483,835 Italian firms
for further analysis.
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Figure 3: The Ownership Structure of a Large Business Group
Given that the ownership network is directed, the firms that control
no subsidiaries in a business group have no connecting path to other
firms. Newman (2003) and Rochat (2009) have introduced the harmonic
centrality which can avoid this problem by considering the reciprocal of
the distance. The definition of the harmonic centrality of a node i is
ci =
∑
j
1
dij
where dij is the number of links in a shortest path connecting node i to
node j. If node i has no path to node j, their distance is considered as
infinity and the reciprocal is thus zero. Therefore, a node which has no
path to any other node in the network has a centrality value of zero.
We notice that nodes in a large component are prone to have larger
harmonic centrality values. To reduce the effect of component size on
centrality value, we provide a novel measure which normalizes the har-
monic centrality to the interval [0, 1]. By doing so, we make it more
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comparable when assessing how central a firm is across business groups
of different sizes.
We define the normalized harmonic centrality as follows:
nci =
ci −minj∈g(ni){cj}
maxj∈g(ni){cj} −minj∈g(ni){cj}
(2.1)
where ni is component size, that is, the number of nodes in the compo-
nent that node i belongs to. g(ni) is any component of size ni. Given a
component of size ni, the largest possible value of centrality is reached
when a node is directly connected to all the other ni − 1 nodes. In a di-
rected graph 11, the minimal centrality is obviously 0, and formula 2.1
can be rewritten as
nci =
ci
ni − 1
In our case, ni is the number of firms in the business group that firm i
belongs to. Given a business group of size ni, the largest possible value
of centrality is reached when the ultimate owner directly controls all the
ni − 1 subsidiaries. The comparison of harmonic and the normalized
centrality values of three examples is illustrated in Figure 4 and 5.
It should be noticed that although our sample is restricted to the Ital-
ian firms, 9.9% of them are in multinational groups. Since our centrality
measure reflects a firm’s position in the business group, the number of
steps in the network between an Italian firm and a foreign firm in the
same business group is also taken into account when computing the cen-
trality.
Business group size
We adopt the number of firms in a business group to measure group
11We build the ownership network based on the control relationship among firms, thus
the direction of the ownership link is taken into account. If we ignore the direction and
treat the network as an undirected one, the minimal possible centrality is reached when the
component is a chain. The node at either end of the chain has the minimal centrality value,
which is equal to
∑ni−1
k=1
1
k
. In this case, formula 2.1 can be rewritten as
nci =
ci −
∑ni−1
k=1
1
k
ni − 1−
∑ni−1
k=1
1
k
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Figure 4: Original Harmonic Cen-
trality
Figure 5: Normalized Harmonic
Centrality
size12 (Belenzon et al., 2017; Del Prete and Rungi, 2015). Since this mea-
sure has a long-tail distribution, we perform a log transformation to re-
duce the variance. Another measure of business group size is the di-
ameter. Diameter is defined as the longest of all the shortest paths in a
network, which in our case is a business group. For example, among all
the shortest paths, the longest distance of the three prototypes in Figure
5 are respectively 2, 3 and 4. Watts and Strogatz (1998) and Baraba´si and
Albert (1999) argue that the diameter of a network increases logarithmi-
cally with the addition of new nodes. Hence, it can be viewed as a proxy
of the logarithm of the number of firms in a business group.
Control Variables
The covariates include the firm-level factors in 2014, such as number
of employees, capital intensity, firm age, whether the business group is
multinational, dummies of sectors and regions. When we use the 3-year
sales growth rate as the dependent variable, we also control the loga-
rithm form of sales in 2011.
12Since the ownership network of each business group identified by our algorithm may
include the individual ultimate owner, the actual number of firms in a group can be 1 less
than the number of nodes in its network. We make some further efforts to identify the
possible individual ultimate owners. See the details in Appendix 2.6.6
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In addition, we use the pyramidal index (PI) introduced by Belenzon
et al. (2013) as a control variable. The index reflects the extent to which
the organization of subsidiaries is hierarchical by measuring the distribu-
tion of subsidiaries in different ownership levels. They define the pyra-
midal index as 2(
∑N
i=1 i×sharei−1)
#Affiliates−1 , where N is the largest number of steps
to the ultimate owner, sharei is the ratio of the number of subsidiaries
that are located at level i to the total number of subsidiaries in the group,
and #Affiliates is the number of subsidiaries in the group. The value of
PI varies from 0 to 1. The higher value indicates that the group structure
is more hierarchical. Aghion and Tirole (1997) argue that the hierarchi-
cal structures in which decision-making responsibility over non-routine
tasks is delegated to local managers result in better decisions.
2.3.3 Empirical Models
We first explore the overall relationship between firm performance
and respectively firm centrality and group size through the following
linear regression models.
Yi = α+ β1 centralityi + β2 logBG sizej + γ
′
Zi + i (2.2)
where Yi is the performance of firm i, and j is the business group that
firm i belongs to. Zi are the covariates aforementioned. Since the per-
formance of the firm within the same business group can be correlated,
we relax the assumption of the independence of residuals. Instead, we
use the cluster-robust standard errors in the estimation by controlling the
component they belong to.
Second, we examine the relation between firm centrality and perfor-
mance given group size. To guarantee that each subsample has enough
observations, we merge some business groups of different sizes into few
intervals. We run the regression model 2.2 separately over the subsam-
ples, dropping the term logBG sizej .
Next we compare the relation between business group size and firm
performance given the centrality level. According to the empirical distri-
bution of centrality, we generally select the central firms and the periph-
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eral subsidiaries as two subsamples. Then we separately run regressions,
dropping the centrality term from 2.2.
2.4 Results and Discussion
2.4.1 Descriptive Statistics
We report the summary statistics of the variables in Table 3 and their
correlation matrix in Table 4.
Table 3: Summary Statistics
Variables N mean sd p10 p50 p90
3-year sales growth 247,092 0.646 15.85 -0.184 0.010 0.519
centrality 483,835 0.0628 0.215 0 0 0
No. firms in BG 483,835 14.53 109.0 2 2 6
diameter 483,835 1.674 1.592 1 1 3
No. employees 395,395 14.15 167.1 1 3 18
sales 2014 396,447 4,265 111,392 0 255 3,629
sales per labour 2014 395,112 229.6 2,305 0 76 380
sales 2013 308,425 5,273 131,897 27 384 4,603
sales 2012 290,611 5,560 138,663 24 402 4,869
sales 2011 270,594 5,883 131,279 22 432 5,326
value added 396,730 912.9 21,688 -7 67 897
labour productivity 395,395 45.26 700.0 -5.069 22.20 80
fixed assets 396,357 1,641 79,799 0 33 1,554
capital intensity 395,025 370.7 5,675 0 7.250 438
age 483,751 14.27 12.39 3 10 31
mne 483,835 0.0987 0.298 0 0 0
PI 159,883 0.2276 0.3412 0 0.0105 1
ownership level 483,831 1.098 0.535 1 1 2
2.4.2 Main Results
We then perform linear regression to explore the relationship between
firm performance and the interaction of centrality and business group
size. Table 5 reports the regression results.13 The coefficient of centrality
13All regression results reported in this chapter are based on the majority control net-
work. The results of the other two definitions of network are consistent and available upon
request. In the regression model, the observations with the values of their dependent vari-
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Table 4: Correlation Matrix
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is significant and positive in all the specifications, controlling number of
firms in the business group or diameter to measure group size, and with
or without the PI14 measure. The results show that both firm centrality
and group size are in general positively correlated with sales growth dur-
ing the crisis. Table 13 and Table 16 in Appendix 2.6 present the results
using labour productivity and sales per employee as performance mea-
sure and the results are consistent. We also notice that the coefficients
of the two specifications are very close. This is mainly due to the high
correlation between the two measures of business group size. As shown
in Table 4, the correlation between the diameter and the logarithm form
of number of firms in the business group is as high as 0.946, which is in
line with the theory in Watts and Strogatz (1998) and Baraba´si and Albert
(1999).
We further explore the relation between firm centrality and perfor-
mance given the group size15. To guarantee that each subsmaple has
enough observations, we divide the firms according to the following in-
tervals of the group size: [3, 5], [6, 7], [8, 13], [14, 50], [50, +∞). The
results are shown in Table 6. We notice that centrality is significant and
positive when the component size is smaller than 50. However, the cen-
trality is not significant under the significance level of 0.05 in the sub-
sample of business groups of size between 8 and 13. Table 14 and 17
in Appendix 2.6 show the results using the other two performance mea-
sures. We find that when the business group size is larger than 7, the
centrality is not always significant and sometimes even negative. The re-
sults imply that the centrality of Italian firms in the ownership network
and their performance during the crisis are positively correlated if the
business group size is smaller than 8.
able lying in the 1% tail of the distribution are excluded. We also make a robustness check
by dropping the observations in the 5% tail of the distribution, and the results are similar
and hence not reported here.
14The results in the rest of this chapter are reduced to the sample of firms making part
of groups of size larger than 2. On one hand, the PI measure requires that the business
groups have at least three companies. On the other hand, due to the data restriction, some
groups of size 2 in our algorithm can be composed of an individual ultimate owner and a
company. See Appendix 2.6.6 for more details.
15Since the log number of firms is highly correlated with diameter, we use only the former
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Table 5: Regression Results of Centrality and Business Group Size
Dependent variable: 3-years average sales growth rate
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
centrality 0.155*** 0.152*** 0.0813*** 0.0787***
(0.00667) (0.00666) (0.0105) (0.0105)
(log) No. firms 0.0471*** 0.0268***
(0.00722) (0.00692)
diameter 0.0236*** 0.0112***
(0.00369) (0.00320)
PI 0.0325*** 0.0248***
(0.00804) (0.00788)
(log) No. employees 0.213*** 0.213*** 0.181*** 0.181***
(0.00264) (0.00264) (0.00412) (0.00412)
(log) capital intensity 0.0239*** 0.0240*** 0.0182*** 0.0184***
(0.000832) (0.000836) (0.00145) (0.00145)
(log) sales 2011 -0.230*** -0.230*** -0.200*** -0.199***
(0.00252) (0.00251) (0.00388) (0.00387)
mne 0.0872*** 0.101*** 0.0617*** 0.0765***
(0.00762) (0.00707) (0.00861) (0.00775)
age -0.00406*** -0.00407*** -0.00381*** -0.00383***
(0.000135) (0.000136) (0.000247) (0.000247)
sectors Yes Yes Yes Yes
regions Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 1.248*** 1.256*** 1.165*** 1.176***
(0.0127) (0.0128) (0.0223) (0.0222)
Observations 244,542 244,542 79,744 79,744
R-squared 0.152 0.152 0.131 0.131
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6: Regression Results of Subsamples by Business Group Sizes
Dependent variable: 3-years average sales growth rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Size 3-5 Size 6-7 Size 8-13 Size 14-50 Size 50+
centrality 0.0842*** 0.160*** 0.0579* 0.101** 0.0859
(0.0117) (0.0380) (0.0335) (0.0457) (0.128)
PI 0.0404*** 0.0314 0.0718 0.130 1.389***
(0.0082) (0.0463) (0.0659) (0.117) (0.487)
(log) No. employees 0.193*** 0.152*** 0.181*** 0.140*** 0.165***
(0.00537) (0.0136) (0.0145) (0.0109) (0.0117)
(log) capital intensity 0.01797*** 0.00470 0.0195*** 0.0197*** 0.0222***
(0.00537) (0.00528) (0.00486) (0.00439) (0.00510)
(log) sales 2011 -0.213*** -0.187*** -0.212*** -0.171*** -0.171***
(0.0048) (0.0121) (0.0140) (0.0127) (0.0106)
age -0.00380*** -0.00450*** -0.00316*** -0.00340*** -0.00414***
(0.000224) (0.000659) (0.00105) (0.000570) (0.000571)
mne 0.0506*** 0.0158 0.0737*** 0.0160 0.0838
(0.0094) (0.0204) (0.0211) (0.0305) (0.0724)
sectors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
regions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 1.265*** 1.264*** 1.346*** 1.121*** 0.925***
(0.0279) (0.0737) (0.0882) (0.0901) (0.0960)
Observations 54,472 6,505 6,363 6,433 5,971
R-squared 0.137 0.132 0.147 0.138 0.113
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Then we investigate the relationship between firm performance and
the size of the group it belongs to, given a certain level of centrality. Ac-
cording to the centrality distribution, we consider the firms with central-
ity smaller than 0.1 as peripheral and no smaller than 0.5 as central. The
first two columns in Table 7 report the regression results by using the
subsamples of central and peripheral firms. We notice that the business
group size (in log) is significant and takes a positive sign in both spec-
ifications, implying a positive relationship between firm’s sales growth
rate and group size for both the central and peripheral ones.
We further explore their relation by using dummies of group size
intervals. The results are shown in the third and fourth column of Ta-
ble 7. Using the business group size of 3 as benchmark, we find that
the dummy variables of group size intervals are statistically significant
and take a positive sign. What’s more, we notice that the coefficients
of the size intervals dummies in the subsample of peripheral firms in-
crease with group size. In other words, as group size increases, the sales
growth difference between an subsidiary in a group of size larger than
3 firms and that in a group of 3 firms becomes larger. We check this
by using the other two performance measures and find that the coeffi-
cients also increase with group size, though it decreases once the group
size exceeds 50 (see details in Table 15 and Table 18 in Appendix 2.6).
More interestingly, when the group size is no smaller than 8, the coeffi-
cients in the subsample of peripheral firms are even larger than those in
the subsample of central firms. This still holds when we use the other
two measures as dependent variables. The results suggest that there is
a larger performance gap between Italian firms located in the periphery
of the networks of large (size ≥ 8) and of small business groups (size
= 3), compared with that of the firms located in central positions in the
networks of large and small groups. This is probably due to that though
firms at a central position in larger business groups can facilitate the ac-
cess to funds and information, they face higher coordination costs than
in small groups. However, for firms at a peripheral position in larger
groups, the benefit of the reputation effect and the availability to diverse
to measure business group size here and below.
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resources can be much larger than that in small groups. In the context of
financial crisis, being a member of a large group also makes the periph-
eral firms more resilient to the exogenous financial shocks and faster to
recover compared with in small groups.
More interestingly, we notice that the PI measure is significant in all
the specifications in Table 7. It takes a positive sign using the subsamples
of peripheral firms while a negative sign using those of the central firms.
The results imply that the peripheral firms have better performance in
groups with more hierarchical structure while the central firms have bet-
ter performance in groups with flatter structure.
We also conduct another approach to compare the performance of
firms in large and small groups given similar position in the network. We
first select all the global business groups of size larger than 3 including
at least 1 Italian firm. Then we randomly remove 10% of the links from
these business groups’ ownership structure, and obtain some ”faked”
business groups of size 3. Based on their position in the ownership
structure, we divide them into three sets, which are respectively head-
quarters, intermediate-level firms and bottom-level subsidiaries. These
treated firms are then matched with firms at the corresponding position
in the business groups of original size 3 by region, sector, age and sales.
We use the Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) method provided by Ia-
cus et al. (2008), which allows using a regression model to deal with
the remained imbalance after matching. Controlling for the number of
employees, capital intensity and sales (in log) in 2011, we estimate the
treatment effect on sales growth. The aforementioned steps started from
the random split are repeated for 30 times and we derive 30 estimation
results for each of the three sets. The results of the treatment effect are
shown in Figure 6. We can notice that in the bottom-level subsidiaries
set, there is a significantly positive effect in almost all samples. While the
set of headquarters has the lowest proportion of the significantly posi-
tive effect. These findings further support the previous results, that is,
the performance gap in large and small groups for the peripheral sub-
sidiaries is bigger than for the central ones.
We further compare the peripheral firms in business groups with the
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Table 7: Regression Results of Subsamples by Centrality Levels
Dependent variable: 3-years average sales growth rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Periphery Central Periphery Central
(log) BG size 0.0213*** 0.0648***
(0.00692) (0.0121)
BG size 4-5 0.0380*** 0.0586***
(0.00772) (0.0153)
BG size 6-7 0.0779*** 0.113***
(0.0125) (0.0243)
BG size 8-13 0.105*** 0.0995***
(0.0138) (0.0260)
BG size 14-50 0.121*** 0.117***
(0.0153) (0.0305)
BG size 50+ 0.139*** 0.103*
(0.0217) (0.0577)
PI 0.0772*** -0.0576*** 0.0735*** -0.0402**
(0.0114) (0.0156) (0.0115) (0.0162)
(log) No. employees 0.186*** 0.161*** 0.185*** 0.162***
(0.00482) (0.00842) (0.00480) (0.00842)
(log) capital intensity 0.0189*** 0.0161*** 0.0182*** 0.0153***
(0.00168) (0.00312) (0.00167) (0.00311)
(log) sales 2011 -0.205*** -0.185*** -0.207*** -0.185***
(0.00450) (0.00817) (0.00448) (0.00817)
age -0.00425*** -0.00236*** -0.00422*** -0.00229***
(0.000338) (0.000388) (0.000331) (0.000386)
mne 0.0806*** 0.00212 0.0475*** 0.000601
(0.0110) (0.0124) (0.0108) (0.0124)
sectors Yes Yes Yes Yes
regions Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 1.202*** 1.154*** 1.222*** 1.201***
(0.0255) (0.0562) (0.0264) (0.0562)
Observations 61,074 13,491 61,074 13,491
R-squared 0.136 0.123 0.138 0.124
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 6: Treatment Effect of Firms Split from Business Groups of Size > 3
standalone ones using a matching approach. 112,792 Italian standalone
firms with full financial data in AIDA in 2014 are used as the control
group. The standalone ones are matched with the treatment group, that
is, the peripheral firms (with centrality value less than 0.1) in business
groups by region, sector, age and sales. We also use the CEM method
here. The regression results are presented in Table 8. We notice that
the coefficient of the treatment group is significant and takes a positive
sign in all the specifications. Moreover, the coefficient grows with the
business group size, though it decreases a bit once the group size ex-
ceeds 50. We make another robustness check by restricting the sample
to the firms with no subsidiary, that is, with centrality value of 0. The
regression results reported in Table 19 in Appendix 2.6.4 are consistent.
The results show that the Italian subsidiaries located in the periphery of
large groups’ ownership network have a higher sales growth rate than
the standalone ones during the crisis. The findings above suggest that it
is more beneficial for the peripheral subsidiaries in small business groups
and the standalone firms to be merged into larger business groups where
they can gain more advantages and are more resilient to financial shocks
in the crisis.
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Table 8: Regression of Peripheral Firms’ Subsamples by BG Sizes after CEM
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2.4.3 Comparison between Centrality Measure and Own-
ership Level
In this part we compare our centrality measure with the one in Be-
lenzon et al. (2017). By analysing the data on the structure of corpo-
rate groups in Western Europe, they find that the focal subsidiaries with
greater organizational distance from parent companies have lower sales
growth rate and their performance is more similar to that of the matched
standalones in response to changing industry conditions. They adopt the
ownership level to measure the organizational distance in the hierarchi-
cal structure of the group, which is defined as the number of intermediate
subsidiaries separating a focal subsidiary from parent company plus 1.
We also explore the relation between ownership level and firm growth
using the data of Italian firms. The summary statistics of growth rate by
ownership level is present in Table 9.16 We can notice that on average,
the Italian subsidiaries with a longer organizational distance from the ul-
timate owner in the ownership network have a larger sales growth rate
during the crisis.
Table 9: 3-years Average Sales Growth by Ownership Level
Sample: group size ≥ 2 Sample: group size ≥ 3
Ownership level Mean Std. Dev. Freq. Mean Std. Dev. Freq.
1 0.133 0.717 10,480 0.126 0.676 3,682
2 0.159 0.716 211,640 0.162 0.736 53,595
3 0.183 0.766 16,521 0.183 0.766 16,521
4 0.182 0.775 4,012 0.182 0.775 4,012
5 0.196 0.822 1,251 0.196 0.822 1,251
6 0.208 0.858 714 0.208 0.858 714
Total 0.160 0.722 244,618 0.167 0.744 79,775
We use the ownership level in place of our centrality measure in the
previous models. As Table 10 shows, its coefficient is significant and
takes a positive sign in most of the specifications. We also make a robust-
ness check by matching each firm in the sample with a standalone and
use the difference of sales growth rate between them as the dependent
16Following Belenzon et al. (2017)’s strategy, we replace the values of ownership level
larger than 6 with 6.
30
variable. The results reported in Table 21 in Appendix 2.6.5 also show
that the coefficient of ownership level is significantly positive. The re-
sults seems to contradict those of Belenzon et al. (2017). This might be
due to that their measure is highly correlated with group size, given that
their correlation coefficient in our data is as high as 0.581 (see Table 4).
Another possible explanation is that we focus on Italian business groups
in the crisis period while they consider European groups before the crisis.
Table 10: Regression Results of Ownership level
Dependent variable: 3-years average sales growth rate
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
ownership level 0.0233*** -0.00530 0.0219*** 0.0115*
(0.00356) (0.00665) (0.00414) (0.00622)
(log) BG size 0.0420*** 0.0168**
(0.00891) (0.00748)
PI 0.0313*** 0.0461***
(0.00765) (0.00909)
(log) No. employees 0.218*** 0.217*** 0.187*** 0.186***
(0.00264) (0.00267) (0.00413) (0.00414)
(log) capital intensity 0.0257*** 0.0247*** 0.0179*** 0.0175***
(0.000823) (0.000830) (0.00143) (0.00144)
(log) sales 2011 -0.226*** -0.228*** -0.198*** -0.199***
(0.00241) (0.00250) (0.00378) (0.00383)
industry growth 0.103*** 0.0952*** 0.108*** 0.105***
(0.0117) (0.0121) (0.0148) (0.0149)
mne 0.154*** 0.101*** 0.0881*** 0.0673***
(0.00641) (0.00740) (0.00763) (0.00811)
age -0.00365*** -0.00371*** -0.00339*** -0.00341***
(0.000130) (0.000131) (0.000231) (0.000231)
sectors Yes Yes Yes Yes
regions Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 1.171*** 1.185*** 1.100*** 1.093***
(0.0140) (0.0150) (0.0231) (0.0228)
Observations 244,538 244,538 79,744 79,744
R-squared 0.149 0.150 0.132 0.132
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
To separate the effect of group size on the measure, we split the data
into subsamples based on the group size. As Table 11 shows, the coeffi-
cient of ownership level, though not significant, is negative if group size
is small and becomes positive when it exceeds 14. If we use the sales
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growth rate difference between a focal firm and a matched standalone
one as the dependent variable, the results are consistent (see Table 21).
By considering the effect of group size, we find that the positive effect
of ownership level is mainly in large groups. In other words, the Ital-
ian subsidiaries at more bottom level in the ownership network of larger
business group (size ≥ 14) have a relatively better performance in the
crisis. While in small business groups, their performance is worse than
those closer to the headquarters in the network, which is in line with our
previous findings.
Compared with ownership level, our centrality measure resolves the
problem of its high collinearity with group size. It is also more informa-
tive since it takes into account the number of steps of a focal firm to all
its direct and indirect controlling subsidiaries, which reflects to a certain
extent its coordinating power in the group’s ownership network.
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we empirically investigate the relationship between
the interaction of firm centrality and business group size and firm per-
formance. Specifically, we find a positive relationship between firm cen-
trality and performance in small business groups, which however is not
always significant in larger business groups. We also find a positive re-
lationship between firm performance and group size for the peripheral
subsidiaries, and the group size premium for them is larger than for the
central firms. The findings suggest that there can be a trade-off effect on
the performance for firms at central positions in large business groups.
Though they can facilitate the access to funds and information, they pos-
sibly face higher coordination costs than in small groups. But for firms
located in the periphery of larger groups’ ownership network, the ben-
efit of the reputation effect and the availability to diverse resources can
be much larger than that in small groups. Especially during the crisis,
peripheral subsidiaries of a large business group are more resilient to the
exogenous financial shocks compared with similar ones in small groups.
The findings implicate that it is beneficial for the peripheral subsidiaries
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Table 11: Regression Results of Ownership level by Business Group Size
Dependent variable: 3-years average sales growth rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Size 3-5 Size 6-7 Size 8-13 Size 14-50 Size 50+
ownership level -0.00588 -0.0347* -0.0160 0.00969 0.00962
(0.00737) (0.0187) (0.0144) (0.0116) (0.0100)
PI 0.0639*** 0.139** 0.145* 0.0784 1.105**
(0.00874) (0.0646) (0.0840) (0.150) (0.470)
(log) No. employees 0.196*** 0.162*** 0.185*** 0.149*** 0.175***
(0.00537) (0.0135) (0.0145) (0.0118) (0.0124)
(log) capital intensity 0.0181*** 0.00446 0.0179*** 0.0167*** 0.0192***
(0.00177) (0.00533) (0.00480) (0.00447) (0.00470)
(log) sales 2011 -0.211*** -0.186*** -0.210*** -0.170*** -0.174***
(0.00478) (0.0121) (0.0139) (0.0126) (0.0111)
industry growth 0.0954*** 0.162*** 0.0625* 0.0890*** 0.108**
(0.0202) (0.0504) (0.0357) (0.0328) (0.0485)
mne 0.0609*** 0.0266 0.0773*** 0.0195 0.0648
(0.00928) (0.0202) (0.0213) (0.0304) (0.0732)
age -0.00356*** -0.00398*** -0.00298*** -0.00282*** -0.00371***
(0.000222) (0.000635) (0.000996) (0.000562) (0.000567)
sectors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
regions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 1.205*** 1.177*** 1.303*** 1.016*** 0.871***
(0.0313) (0.0787) (0.0931) (0.0810) (0.0968)
Observations 54,472 6,505 6,363 6,433 5,971
R-squared 0.137 0.133 0.148 0.140 0.116
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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in small groups and the standalone firms to be merged into larger busi-
ness groups.
Our contribution to the literature on ownership network of business
group is twofold. First, we provide a new measure of centrality. Consid-
ering that the ownership level measure used in Belenzon et al. (2017) has
a high correlation with group size, we adopt the normalized harmonic
centrality measure to reduce the size effect. Consequently, we make cen-
trality more comparable across groups of different sizes. Second, though
the effect of individual-level centrality and group-level complexity on
firm performance has been separately discussed in literature, the rela-
tion between their interaction and firm performance is underexploited.
By performing a detailed analysis with multiple robustness checks, we
shed light on the role of a firm’s network position in groups of different
sizes on its performance.
The current study is subject to several limitations. First, we have only
cross-section data of the ownership structure, which is standard in the lit-
erature since it is difficult to trace its change over time. Due to this restric-
tion, we cannot test the issue of causality. In our analysis, we find that
the peripheral firms in large business groups are much more productive
than the standalone ones. However, we cannot tell whether these firms
are already productive before being merged into the business group or
they improve their performance after the take-over.
Second, we have limited information about the shareholders in the
current data. As a result, a business group defined in our work may also
include its ultimate beneficial owner who controls the parent company.
Though it is necessary to distinguish different types of ownership, how
to deal with the individual or family ultimate beneficial owners requires
more attention. If firms are directly controlled by the same ultimate bene-
ficial owner(s), they can be viewed as members of a group rather than in-
dependent since their business can be related in some way. Cainelli and
Iacobucci (2011) and Belenzon et al. (2017) define these firms as members
of a business group. In the case of Italy, business groups controlled by
family are quite common (Corbetta and Tomaselli, 1996; Cucculelli and
Micucci, 2008) and this case of business groups should be taken more
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attention.
Finally, in our data we have only the balance sheet data of the Ital-
ian domestic firms but not for the foreign firms in these business groups.
The existing studies also control the average performance of all the firms
within a business group. We will add these group-level measures in the
future once the data is available. Moreover, with the financial data of
firms in other countries, we can also extend our analysis to the global
scale and explore the difference of firm performance in different coun-
tries.
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2.6 Appendix
2.6.1 Variables Definition
Table 12: Variables Definition
Variables Definition
3-years sales growth (
∑2013
i=2011(salesi+1 − salesi)/salesi)/3.
centrality A measure of firm’s centrality in a business group.
BG size The number of firms that belong to a business group.
diameter The longest of all the shortest paths in a network.
labour productivity value added/No. employees in 2014.
sales per employee sales/No. employees in 2014.
capital intensity fixed assets/No. employees in 2014.
mne A dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm belongs to a multinational group, otherwise 0.
ownership level The number of subsidiaries separating a focal subsidiary from parent company plus 1.
PI The pyramidal index defined by Belenzon et al. (2013).
sectors A set of dummy variables that equal to 1 if a firm belongs to a certain sector, and
sector 4 is used as benchmark in the regression.
1: Agriculture, forestry and fishing.
2: Manufacturing, mining and quarrying and other industry.
3: Construction.
4: Wholesale and retail trade, transportation and storage, accommodation and
food service activities.
5: Information and communication.
6: Financial and insurance activities.
7: Real estate activities (includeing imputed rents of owner-occupied dwellings).
8: Professional, scientific, technical, administration and support service activities.
9: Public administration, defence, education, human health and social work activities.
10: Other services.
regions A set of dummy variables that takes value of 1 if a firm belongs to a
certain region and region 2 is used as benchmark in the regression.
1: NordOvest.
2: NordEst.
3: Centro.
4: Mezzogiorno.
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2.6.2 Robustness Check 1: Using Labor Productivity as
Dependent Variable
Table 13: Regression Results of Centrality and Different BG Size Measures
Dependent variable: log labor productivity
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
centrality 0.244*** 0.239*** 0.114*** 0.111***
(0.00855) (0.00863) (0.0142) (0.0143)
(log) No. firms 0.104*** 0.0552***
(0.0136) (0.0149)
diameter 0.0530*** 0.0248***
(0.00682) (0.00688)
PI 0.0749*** 0.0605***
(0.0106) (0.0103)
(log) No. employees 0.188*** 0.188*** 0.126*** 0.126***
(0.00247) (0.00238) (0.00385) (0.00373)
(log) capital intensity 0.157*** 0.157*** 0.152*** 0.153***
(0.00106) (0.00105) (0.00187) (0.00186)
age 0.00303*** 0.00301*** 0.00153*** 0.00148***
(0.000168) (0.000168) (0.000273) (0.000271)
mne 0.151*** 0.180*** 0.195*** 0.223***
(0.0119) (0.0108) (0.0150) (0.0130)
sectors Yes Yes Yes Yes
regions Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 2.254*** 2.273*** 2.556*** 2.578***
(0.00986) (0.00807) (0.0211) (0.0178)
Observations 285,309 285,309 88,070 88,070
R-squared 0.239 0.238 0.199 0.199
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 14: Regression Results of Subsamples by Business Group Sizes
Dependent variable: (log) labor productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES BG size 3-5 BG size 6-7 BG size 8-13 BG size 14-50 BG size 50+
centrality 0.156*** 0.150*** -0.0694 -0.0509 -0.239*
(0.0159) (0.0432) (0.0485) (0.0568) (0.122)
PI 0.0656*** 0.0856 0.0123 0.310 3.283***
(0.0106) (0.0655) (0.0935) (0.207) (0.870)
(log) No. employees 0.163*** 0.0688*** 0.0452*** 0.0281*** 0.119***
(0.00360) (0.00917) (0.00935) (0.0103) (0.0121)
(log) capital intensity 0.163*** 0.148*** 0.139*** 0.129*** 0.112***
(0.00206) (0.00606) (0.00630) (0.00675) (0.0100)
age 0.00175*** 0.000838 -0.000339 0.00151* 0.00338***
(0.000305) (0.000811) (0.000598) (0.000846) (0.000956)
mne 0.127*** 0.154*** 0.195*** 0.209*** 0.391***
(0.0145) (0.0299) (0.0290) (0.0521) (0.121)
sectors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
regions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 2.485*** 2.922*** 3.116*** 3.285*** 2.745***
(0.0142) (0.0504) (0.0580) (0.0830) (0.143)
Observations 61,744 6,905 6,622 6,557 6,242
R-squared 0.194 0.179 0.166 0.145 0.154
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 15: Regression Results of Subsamples by Centrality Levels
Dependent variable: (log) labor productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Periphery Central Periphery Central
(log) BG size 0.0370** 0.0611***
(0.0144) (0.0175)
BG size 4-5 0.119*** 0.0832***
(0.00995) (0.0199)
BG size 6-7 0.230*** 0.166***
(0.0168) (0.0313)
BG size 8-13 0.314*** 0.0693*
(0.0188) (0.0362)
BG size 14-50 0.349*** 0.0912**
(0.0255) (0.0428)
BG size 50+ 0.210*** 0.154*
(0.0379) (0.0844)
PI 0.118*** -0.177*** 0.0947*** -0.149***
(0.0137) (0.0218) (0.0136) (0.0230)
(log) No. employees 0.145*** 0.0752*** 0.138*** 0.0758***
(0.00437) (0.00610) (0.00390) (0.00612)
(log) capital intensity 0.152*** 0.156*** 0.150*** 0.155***
(0.00215) (0.00414) (0.00212) (0.00415)
age 0.00134*** 0.00240*** 0.00139*** 0.00246***
(0.000318) (0.000513) (0.000325) (0.000512)
mne 0.260*** 0.0927*** 0.180*** 0.0914***
(0.0194) (0.0191) (0.0167) (0.0191)
sectors Yes Yes Yes Yes
regions Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 2.523*** 2.976*** 2.523*** 3.005***
(0.0212) (0.0455) (0.0145) (0.0410)
Observations 69,432 13,495 69,432 13,495
R-squared 0.193 0.189 0.201 0.191
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2.6.3 Robustness Check 2: Using Sales per Employee as
Dependent Variable
Table 16: Regression Results of Centrality and Different BG Size Measures
Dependent variable: log sales per employee
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
centrality 0.299*** 0.295*** 0.156*** 0.156***
(0.00949) (0.00957) (0.0153) (0.0154)
(log) No. firms 0.0953*** 0.0412***
(0.0130) (0.0119)
diameter 0.0503*** 0.0201***
(0.00673) (0.0056)
PI 0.0466*** 0.0363***
(0.0115) (0.0113)
(log) No. employees 0.0849*** 0.0848*** 0.104*** 0.104***
(0.00264) (0.00261) (0.00379) (0.00375)
(log) capital intensity 0.0932*** 0.0934*** 0.0912*** 0.0913***
(0.00112) (0.00111) (0.00195) (0.00194)
age 0.00373*** 0.00370*** 0.00228*** 0.00224***
(0.000184) (0.000184) (0.000315) (0.000314)
mne 0.204*** 0.226*** 0.217*** 0.234***
(0.0120) (0.0110) (0.0145) (0.0129)
sectors Yes Yes Yes Yes
regions Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 4.142*** 4.158*** 4.250*** 4.263***
(0.00958) (0.00807) (0.0199) (0.0177)
Observations 299,871 299,871 92,800 92,800
R-squared 0.162 0.162 0.153 0.153
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 17: Regression Results of Subsamples by Business Group Sizes
Dependent variable: (log) sales per employee
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Size 3-5 Size 6-7 Size 8-13 Size 14-50 Size 50+
centrality 0.198*** 0.143*** -0.00595 0.0729 -0.218
(0.0178) (0.0478) (0.0490) (0.0622) (0.142)
PI 0.0427*** -0.00752 -0.0221 0.212 3.393***
(0.0118) (0.0731) (0.108) (0.211) (0.780)
(log) No. employees 0.117*** 0.0778*** 0.0584*** 0.0579*** 0.116***
(0.00405) (0.0106) (0.0107) (0.0106) (0.0117)
(log) capital intensity 0.0929*** 0.0912*** 0.0750*** 0.0732*** 0.0919***
(0.00221) (0.00652) (0.00639) (0.00652) (0.00843)
age 0.00276*** 0.000828 0.000195 0.00310*** 0.00288***
(0.000331) (0.000923) (0.000841) (0.000932) (0.000960)
mne 0.166*** 0.154*** 0.250*** 0.225*** 0.367***
(0.0156) (0.0325) (0.0338) (0.0525) (0.124)
sectors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
regions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 4.247*** 4.439*** 4.658*** 4.604*** 4.290***
(0.0163) (0.0609) (0.0647) (0.0964) (0.144)
Observations 64,505 7,399 7,237 7,080 6,579
R-squared 0.140 0.120 0.124 0.119 0.190
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 18: Regression Results of Subsamples by Centrality Levels
Dependent variable: (log) sales per employee
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Periphery Central Periphery Central
(log) BG size 0.0341*** 0.0567***
(0.0119) (0.0197)
BG size 4-5 0.0848*** 0.0520**
(0.0111) (0.0226)
BG size 6-7 0.186*** 0.107***
(0.0195) (0.0344)
BG size 8-13 0.262*** 0.0440
(0.0214) (0.0375)
BG size 14-50 0.296*** 0.120**
(0.0262) (0.0490)
BG size 50+ 0.191*** 0.0239
(0.0339) (0.115)
PI 0.0830*** -0.141*** 0.0678*** -0.130***
(0.0151) (0.0244) (0.0152) (0.0256)
(log) No. employees 0.111*** 0.0770*** 0.106*** 0.0776***
(0.00445) (0.00693) (0.00415) (0.00695)
(log) capital intensity 0.0862*** 0.116*** 0.0838*** 0.116***
(0.00225) (0.00429) (0.00221) (0.00430)
age 0.00212*** 0.00240*** 0.00220*** 0.00245***
(0.000373) (0.000585) (0.000383) (0.000583)
mne 0.240*** 0.159*** 0.172*** 0.161***
(0.0185) (0.0216) (0.0177) (0.0217)
sectors Yes Yes Yes Yes
regions Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 4.245*** 4.515*** 4.253*** 4.558***
(0.0205) (0.0523) (0.0162) (0.0468)
Observations 72,618 14,663 72,618 14,663
R-squared 0.145 0.179 0.149 0.179
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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2.6.4 Robustness Check 3: Matching the Peripheral firms
with the Standalone Ones
Table 19: Regression of Peripheral Firms’ Subsamples by BG Sizes after
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2.6.5 Robustness Check 4: Ownership Level
Table 20: Regression Results of Ownership level
Dependent variable: sales growth subsidiary - sales growth standalone
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
ownership level 0.0272*** 0.0207*** 0.0243*** 0.0123*
(0.00420) (0.00570) (0.00430) (0.00674)
(log) BG size 0.0107* 0.0169**
(0.00643) (0.00753)
PI 0.0295*** 0.0452***
(0.00768) (0.00927)
(log) No. employees 0.187*** 0.187*** 0.187*** 0.186***
(0.00413) (0.00414) (0.00413) (0.00414)
(log) capital intensity 0.0184*** 0.0182*** 0.0181*** 0.0176***
(0.00142) (0.00142) (0.00142) (0.00143)
(log) sales 2011 -0.199*** -0.199*** -0.199*** -0.199***
(0.00378) (0.00381) (0.00378) (0.00383)
industry growth 0.106*** 0.104*** 0.107*** 0.105***
(0.0149) (0.0150) (0.0149) (0.0150)
mne 0.0829*** 0.0687*** 0.0867*** 0.0661***
(0.00772) (0.00794) (0.00762) (0.00812)
age -0.00318*** -0.00319*** -0.00319*** -0.00321***
(0.000181) (0.000181) (0.000181) (0.000181)
sectors Yes Yes Yes Yes
regions Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.917*** 0.927*** 0.922*** 0.940***
(0.0257) (0.0274) (0.0258) (0.0286)
Observations 79,688 79,688 79,684 79,684
R-squared 0.126 0.126 0.126 0.126
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 21: Regression Results of Ownership level by Business Group Size
Dependent variable: sales growth subsidiary - sales growth standalone
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Size 3-5 Size 6-7 Size 8-13 Size 14-50 Size 50+
ownership level -0.00479 -0.0348* -0.0180 0.0113 0.0115
(0.00738) (0.0186) (0.0147) (0.0132) (0.0145)
PI 0.0626*** 0.140** 0.146* 0.0800 1.190**
(0.00875) (0.0647) (0.0835) (0.152) (0.481)
(log) No. employees 0.196*** 0.161*** 0.188*** 0.149*** 0.176***
(0.00537) (0.0135) (0.0145) (0.0118) (0.0125)
(log) capital intensity 0.0180*** 0.00449 0.0197*** 0.0167*** 0.0197***
(0.00177) (0.00534) (0.00475) (0.00447) (0.00478)
(log) sales 2011 -0.211*** -0.186*** -0.210*** -0.171*** -0.178***
(0.00479) (0.0121) (0.0139) (0.0126) (0.0110)
industry growth 0.0987*** 0.163*** 0.0550 0.0908*** 0.102**
(0.0202) (0.0508) (0.0356) (0.0327) (0.0502)
mne 0.0598*** 0.0248 0.0752*** 0.0167 0.0625
(0.00928) (0.0202) (0.0213) (0.0304) (0.0747)
age -0.00319*** -0.00364*** -0.00413*** -0.00254*** -0.00318***
(0.000226) (0.000646) (0.000589) (0.000584) (0.000590)
sectors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
regions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 1.081*** 1.118*** 1.230*** 0.868*** 0.730***
(0.0388) (0.0963) (0.105) (0.0880) (0.110)
Observations 54,469 6,502 6,359 6,420 5,934
R-squared 0.131 0.122 0.146 0.136 0.111
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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2.6.6 Robustness Check 5: A New Algorithm to Identify
the Individual Shareholders and Results
Though there is no information on the ownership type in the original
data, we make some further attempts to identify the possible ownership
links by the non-companies such as individual, family or state through a
new algorithm. In the main text, we do not differentiate between the ul-
timate beneficial owners and the parent companies, which results in that
some groups belonging to type (a) in Figure 7 are treated as type (c). The
new algorithm first identifies all the nodes with no inward link in the
groups where there is at least one Italian company or non-company.17
If they have shareholders data in the original ORBIS database but with
only minority shareholders, or their BvD ID number can be found in
AIDA, we can confirm that they are the parent companies. Otherwise,
we check the number of outward links they have. If they have more than
1 outward link, we assume that they are individual or family ultimate
beneficial owners who control multiple companies (see type (b) in Fig-
ure 7), thus the group size of type (b) is 1 less than the previous measure.
If they have only 1 outward link, we assume that they are the ultimate
controlling shareholder of the parent company (see type (a)). We then re-
move their links to the parent company and recompute the centrality and
the other network measures for the firms belonging to groups of type (a).
Some groups of size 2 are thus divided into two disconnected nodes, and
the firms used to be part of such groups are excluded from the sample.
We finally derive a new sample of 183,177 Italian firms that belong to
business groups. Table 22 presents some descriptive statistics. Neverthe-
less, the main regression results of the new algorithm and the previous
one in this chapter are generally consistent (see details in Table 23, Table
24 and Table 25). It should be noticed that this new algorithm may overly
drop some ownership links actually by companies or institutions whose
shareholders data are not covered by ORBIS. The results reported here
only aim to provide further support for our findings in this chapter.
17The BvD ID number in ORBIS provides the nationality information of an entity or
individual.
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Figure 7: Three Cases of Business Groups’ Ownership Structure
Table 22: Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES N mean sd p10 p50 p90
3-years sales growth 92,177 0.915 23.88 -0.189 0.0128 0.535
centrality 183,177 0.197 0.375 0 0 1
No. firms in BG 183,177 34.89 175.3 2 3 22
diameter 183,177 2.673 2.223 1 2 5
employees 154,975 26.49 265.3 1 2 36
fixed assets 155,089 3,644 127,495 0 72 3,903
capital intensity 154,617 725.3 8,852 0 10 1,061
value added 155,450 1,989 34,599 -17 91 2,266
labour productivity 154,975 72.95 1,102 -13 29 122
age 183,142 16.43 13.92 4 12 35
mne 183,177 0.174 0.379 0 0 1
sales 2014 155,395 9,407 177,714 0 305 9,237
sales per labour 2014 154,920 354.5 3,623 0 88.50 540.5
sales 2013 111,294 12,718 219,270 26 709 13,564
sales 2012 107,151 13,203 228,039 22 741 13,842
sales 2011 102,349 13,640 213,122 18 787 14,921
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Table 23: Regression Results of Centrality and Business Group Size
Dependent variable: 3-years average sales growth rate
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
centrality 0.0624*** 0.0611*** 0.106*** 0.103***
(0.00763) (0.00778) (0.0111) (0.0112)
(log) No. firms 0.0267*** 0.0306***
(0.00663) (0.00720)
diameter 0.0118*** 0.0123***
(0.00318) (0.00334)
PI 0.0886*** 0.0742***
(0.0166) (0.0169)
(log) No. employees 0.194*** 0.194*** 0.193*** 0.193***
(0.00435) (0.00435) (0.00489) (0.00489)
(log) capital intensity 0.0188*** 0.0190*** 0.0197*** 0.0200***
(0.00151) (0.00151) (0.00169) (0.00170)
(log) sales 2011 -0.218*** -0.218*** -0.217*** -0.217***
(0.00407) (0.00407) (0.00459) (0.00459)
mne 0.0656*** 0.0785*** 0.0587*** 0.0784***
(0.00909) (0.00830) (0.0102) (0.00910)
age -0.00388*** -0.00390*** -0.00402*** -0.00405***
(0.000234) (0.000235) (0.000284) (0.000285)
sectors Yes Yes Yes Yes
regions Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 1.286*** 1.297*** 1.267*** 1.280***
(0.0239) (0.0237) (0.0268) (0.0266)
Observations 91,196 91,196 71,207 71,207
R-squared 0.127 0.127 0.128 0.127
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 24: Regression Results of Subsamples by Business Group Sizes
Dependent variable: 3-years average sales growth rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Size 3-4 Size 5-7 Size 8-11 Size 12-22 Size 23-84 Size 85+
centrality 0.0603*** 0.137*** 0.0563 0.240*** 0.0599 0.177
(0.0140) (0.0291) (0.0414) (0.0667) (0.0628) (0.273)
PI 0.0402** 0.00876 -0.0269 0.259 0.0437 1.763
(0.0191) (0.0545) (0.0900) (0.183) (0.267) (1.143)
(log) No. employees 0.198*** 0.173*** 0.175*** 0.184*** 0.153*** 0.173***
(0.00897) (0.0130) (0.0183) (0.0173) (0.0166) (0.0137)
(log) capital intensity 0.0232*** 0.00880* 0.0216*** 0.0243*** 0.0184** 0.0206***
(0.00295) (0.00499) (0.00580) (0.00629) (0.00757) (0.00556)
(log) sales 2011 -0.221*** -0.213*** -0.207*** -0.241*** -0.173*** -0.184***
(0.00832) (0.0123) (0.0170) (0.0208) (0.0171) (0.0132)
age -0.00376*** -0.00371*** -0.00406*** -0.00442*** -0.00440*** -0.00370***
(0.000382) (0.00104) (0.000730) (0.000843) (0.000685) (0.000653)
mne 0.0421*** -0.000948 0.0523** 0.000832 0.116*** -
(0.0147) (0.0180) (0.0263) (0.0368) (0.0420) -
sectors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
regions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 1.333*** 1.416*** 1.383*** 1.489*** 1.132*** 1.101***
(0.0505) (0.0764) (0.109) (0.128) (0.125) (0.0869)
Observations 21,952 9,261 4,245 4,153 4,484 4,567
R-squared 0.127 0.133 0.134 0.177 0.118 0.106
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 25: Regression Results of Subsamples by Centrality Levels
Dependent variable: 3-years average sales growth rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Periphery Central Periphery Central
(log) BG size 0.0259*** 0.0712***
(0.00721) (0.0145)
BG size 5-7 0.0828*** 0.0859***
(0.0125) (0.0203)
BG size 8-11 0.0979*** 0.0863***
(0.0174) (0.0318)
BG size 12-22 0.129*** 0.158***
(0.0185) (0.0463)
BG size 23-84 0.140*** 0.0946***
(0.0188) (0.0351)
BG size 85+ 0.126*** 0.122
(0.0234) (0.0851)
PI 0.117*** 0.0150 0.0753*** 0.0182
(0.0258) (0.0246) (0.0265) (0.0244)
(log) No. employees 0.196*** 0.178*** 0.196*** 0.178***
(0.00550) (0.0123) (0.00548) (0.0123)
(log) capital intensity 0.0199*** 0.0240*** 0.0194*** 0.0234***
(0.00191) (0.00397) (0.00189) (0.00396)
(log) sales 2011 -0.221*** -0.203*** -0.223*** -0.204***
(0.00509) (0.0124) (0.00510) (0.0125)
age -0.00432*** -0.00309*** -0.00427*** -0.00307***
(0.000365) (0.000495) (0.000358) (0.000494)
mne 0.0702*** 0.0124 0.0437*** 0.0117
(0.0123) (0.0183) (0.0119) (0.0184)
sectors Yes Yes Yes Yes
regions Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 1.293*** 1.268*** 1.328*** 1.355***
(0.0294) (0.0827) (0.0298) (0.0876)
Observations 57,886 8,511 57,886 8,511
R-squared 0.129 0.131 0.131 0.132
Notes: 1. Firms belonging to groups of size 3 and 4 are considered as the benchmark
in the specifications in columns (3) and (4).
2. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
3. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Chapter 3
Foreign Ownership and
Firm Performance:
Evidence from Italy
3.1 Introduction
A vast literature has discussed the advantage of multinational en-
terprises (MNEs) over the domestic firms (Antras and Helpman, 2004;
Dunning, 1988; Helpman et al., 2008; Kohler et al., 2012; Tomiura, 2007).
Based on the location of the ultimate owner, firms involved in a MNE
in a certain country can be generally divided into two types: foreign-
owned subsidiaries and firms in a domestic-owned MNE. A widely dis-
cussed advantage of foreign ownership is the spillover effect (Bernstein
and Mohnen, 1998; Blomstro¨m and Sjo¨holm, 1999; Markusen, 1995). The
foreign-owned subsidiaries can not only receive financial capital but also
superior knowledge and managerial skills, which is especially crucial for
firms in developing countries (Arnold and Javorcik, 2005). As for firms
that invest abroad, opening subsidiaries in foreign countries can develop
new market and increase their profitability because of economies of scale
(Dunning, 1989; Lovelock and Yip, 1996). Some MNEs also invest in off-
shore financial centres and special purpose entities for tax reasons (Desai
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et al., 2004, 2006; UNCTAD, 2015).
UNCTAD (2016) points out that 41% of the foreign affiliates all over
the world are owned through complex hierarchical chains with multiple
cross-border links involving on average three jurisdictions. Since corpo-
rate structures have become increasingly complex, it is important to gain
deep insights into the impact of foreign ownership on domestic firms
from various perspectives such as its direction, multiple cross-border
links, organizational or geographical distance, etc. This chapter is re-
lated to the literature on MNE. In particular, we investigate the relation
between foreign ownership and firm performance by exploiting Italian
firms data that are used in Chapter 2. Through regression analysis, we
find that the firms making part of MNEs are more productive than those
in the domestic business groups. Moreover, among the multinational
firms, the foreign-owned Italian subsidiaries have higher productivity
than the Italian firms in the domestic-owned MNEs.
Then we focus on the foreign-owned Italian subsidiaries. Interest-
ingly, we find that the Italian subsidiaries with shorter organizational
or geographical distance from their foreign owners are on average more
productive. Furthermore, subsidiaries with multiple cross-border links
in the upstream ownership chain are found to be more productive.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. In Section 3.2
we review the existing literature. Then Section 3.3 provides the definition
to classify firms and introduce the econometric specifications, together
with some descriptive statistics of the data. In Section 3.4, we provide
the estimation results and a thorough analysis of them. Finally, Section
3.5 concludes the work.
3.2 Literature Review
Based on the location of the ultimate owners, MNEs in a certain coun-
try can be generally divided into two types: foreign-owned subsidiaries
and firms in a domestic-owned MNE. A large number of studies have
empirically compared the performance of either of these two types of
MNEs with the purely domestic business groups and most of them demo-
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nstrate that MNEs have a better performance over the domestic groups.
Some literature focuses on the foreign-owned subsidiaries. The MNEs
of this type are found to have higher productivity or profitability in both
developed countries such as Canada (Globerman et al., 1994), UK (Girma
et al., 2001), Italy (Bentivogli et al., 2016) and developing countries such
as Indonesia (Arnold and Javorcik, 2005) and China (Greenaway et al.,
2014) since they can benefit from the transfer of financial capital, superior
knowledge and managerial skills. Another strand of works presents ev-
idence that firms that invest abroad improve their performance in terms
of output (Desai et al., 2005; Hijzen et al., 2007), productivity (De La Pot-
terie and Lichtenberg, 2001; Navaretti and Castellani, 2005) and home
employment (Bruno and Falzoni, 2003; Hijzen et al., 2007; Navaretti et al.,
2010) because of reducing production costs, increasing competitiveness
and gaining market shares (Navaretti et al., 2004).
Some studies also compare the performance of these two types of
MNEs, but the results highly depend on the location of the ultimate
owner. For example, Doms and Jensen (1998) find that the foreign MNEs
are less productive than the US-owned MNEs in the United States. Castel-
lani and Zanfei (2003) find that both the crucial innovative activities in-
cluding R&D, product innovation, patenting and technological cooper-
ation with local firms are more likely in Italian MNEs than in foreign-
owned firms in Italy. Temouri et al. (2008) find that the German do-
mestic firms are less productive than MNE, but there is no significant
difference between the domestic German MNEs and the foreign-owned
subsidiaries. Criscuolo and Martin (2009) find that the MNEs in UK are
significantly more productive than the domestic firms. The US-owned
subsidiaries are on average more productive than all the other MNEs.
Furthermore, the US MNEs tend to take over plants that are already more
productive prior to acquisition.
A recent work by UNCTAD (2016) has further discussed the foreign
ownership from the perspective of ownership complexity and investor
nationality. They find that 41% of the foreign subsidiaries worldwide are
owned through complex hierarchical chains with their direct owners and
ultimate owners located in different jurisdictions, and these mismatch
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nationality cases account for 50% in terms of revenue. Their findings
have shed light on the investor nationality conundrum, which has im-
portant implications for national and international investment policies.
3.3 Method
3.3.1 Empirical Method
In this section we discuss the empirical method to explore the relation
between foreign ownership and firm performance.
First we investigate the impact of the direction of the foreign owner-
ship on firm performance. Based on the location of the ultimate owner1,
MNEs in a given country can be generally divided into two types: foreign-
owned subsidiaries and firms in domestic-owned MNEs. We use econo-
metric models to compare the difference of their performance together
with the purely domestic groups and the standalone ones. The loga-
rithm form of labour productivity, defined as value added per employee,
is used to measure firm performance. We also use the logarithm form
of sales per employee as a robustness check. The regression model is as
follows:
log Yi = α+
∑
j
βjDij + γ
′
Xi + i (3.1)
where the dependent variable Yi is the measure of firm performance.
Dij are the dummy variables of the categories of firm i and the firms in
the domestic-owned MNEs are considered as the benchmark group. Xi
are the covariates, including the number of employees2, capital intensity,
firm age, the number of firms in the business group, the dummies of sec-
tors and regions. Since some of them belong to the same business group
1As mentioned in Chapter 2, we cannot distinguish the ownership by entities, states,
individuals or families due to the restriction of the data. Therefore, we consider the one
locates at the top of each corporate ownership structure as the ultimate owner. It can be ei-
ther a parent company whose shareholders are not provided by ORBIS or all have minority
ownership, or the individual who is the ultimate beneficial owner of the business group.
We make a further attempt to deal with this issue in 3.6.4.
2In the original data, 22.2% of the firms are provided with the number of employees
equal to 0. In the main text we shift the variable by adding 1 to all firms in the sample.
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and their performance can be correlated, we relax the assumption of the
independence of residuals. Instead, we use the cluster-robust standard
errors in the estimation by controlling the component they belong to.
Then we restrict our sample to the foreign-owned Italian subsidiaries.
Taking into account the location of their direct owners and ultimate own-
ers, we adopt the strategy provided in UNCTAD (2016) and further di-
vide the foreign-owned Italian subsidiaries (FISs) into three types. Type
1 represents the firms with domestic direct owner and foreign ultimate
owner. Type 2 represents the firms with direct owner and ultimate owner
in two different foreign countries, which is one case of having multiple
cross-border links in the upstream ownership chain. Type 3 represents
the firms with direct owner and foreign owner in the same foreign coun-
try. Figure 8 illustrates the ownership structure of them. The black nodes
at the top layer represent the foreign ultimate owners while the white
nodes at the bottom layer correspond to the Italian subsidiaries, which
are the focus firms in our analysis. The nodes at the intermediate layer
represent the direct owners and the grey node means the nationality of
the direct owner is non-Italian and different from that of the ultimate
owner.
Figure 8: Three Types of Foreign-owned Subsidiaries
In the second model we compare the performance of these three types.
Type 3 are used as benchmark. Besides the aforementioned control vari-
ables, we consider the foreign ownership in the downstream structure.
We add two dummy variables in the model, which are whether they con-
trol any domestic affiliate and whether they control directly or indirectly
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any foreign affiliate.
To generalize the classification in UNCTAD (2016), we adopt an own-
ership level measure similar to the one in Belenzon et al. (2017) which
reflects the organizational distance from the closest foreign owner in the
corporate control structure. The definition of our measure is the num-
ber of intermediate subsidiaries separating a focal firm from the closest
foreign owner. We further develop two dummy variables to investigate
the impact of the geographical distance from the closest foreign owner
and the existence of multiple cross-border links in the ownership chain
on the performance of the focal affiliate. The first one is defined as 1 if a
focal affiliate’s closest foreign owner is located in the EU countries, and
0 otherwise. The second one is defines as 1 if the nationality of a focal
affiliate’s closest foreign owner is the same as that of its ultimate owner,
and 0 otherwise. We use the following regression model to examine the
relation between these measures and firm performance.
log Yi = α+ β1si + β2di + γ
′
Xi + i (3.2)
where si is the number of steps from the closest foreign owner, di is the
dummy variable of whether the closest foreign owner is located in the EU
countries or whether its nationality is the same as the ultimate owner’s.
3.3.2 Data
We derive the ownership data of 17.8 million global firms in 2014
from ORBIS database. Based on their direct shareholding relationship,
we construct the global control network by retaining only the majority
shares.3 Then we restrict our sample to Italian firms. We combine the
ownership data with the AIDA database and collect all the Italian firms’
financial data. Among the 1,164,871 active Italian firms in 2014 in AIDA,
we identify 719,144 firms with ownership information in ORBIS.4 After
3See the details in 2.3.1. In this chapter we consider only the majority control and the
other two methods to build the network are not used here.
4In ORBIS ownership data of 2014, there are 235,309 Italian firms with minority owners,
i.e., who hold no larger than 50% of the stakes. In our algorithm, we cannot identify which
business groups these firms belong to. To separate them from the other types, we define
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removing 320,241 firms with incomplete observations5 and 279,860 firms
with negative financial data, we finally derive a sample of 564,770 Italian
firms.
Table 26 presents some summary statistics of the variables in our
data.6 In our sample the standalone firms have on average the lowest
labour productivity than other types of firms (see Figure 9). Firms in the
purely Italian domestic groups have higher average productivity than
the standalone firms but much lower than the firms in multinational
business groups. The two types of MNE, i.e., firms in the domestic-
owned MNEs and subsidiaries in the foreign-owned MNEs have almost
the same level of productivity.7 To test whether the difference among
categories is statistically significant, we perform econometric models in
the following analysis.
Table 26: Summary Statistics
VARIABLES N mean sd p10 p50 p90
labour productivity 564,770 56.76 625.9 6.500 28.17 84
sales per employee 564,547 223.5 1,771 19.43 90.75 394
value added 564,770 852.1 18,077 12 118 1,035
sales 564,547 3,605 67,958 39 400 4,098
No. employees 564,770 14.58 142.5 1 4 21
fixed assets 564,770 1,440 66,810 3 59 1,688
capital intensity 564,770 352.3 4,837 1 11 469.5
age 564,761 16.16 13.77 3 12 35
group size 564,770 7.347 74.08 1 2 3
steps to closest foreign 13,186 1.298 0.601 1 1 2
closest foreign equal uo 13,186 0.844 0.363 0 1 1
closest foreign close Italy 13,186 0.414 0.493 0 0 1
We present the location distribution of the direct and ultimate own-
ers of all the FISs in Figure 10 and Figure 11. The top three frequent
jurisdictions of ultimate owners are Luxembourg, Netherlands and Ger-
them as other.
5There are 4 Italian firms involved in business groups with cross-shareholdings in which
no ultimate owner can be identified.
6The standalone firms and other types here are considered as groups of size 1.
7Table 34 presents the frequency of the 5 types of firms in our sample. We also perform
the new algorithm described in 2.6.6 to classify the firms into different types of MNEs and
FISs. See more details in Appendix 3.6.4.
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Figure 9: Labour Productivity (log) by Different Categories of Firms
many, which represent respectively 11.8%, 10.9% and 10.4% of the sam-
ple. Among the subsidiaries with foreign direct owners (Type 2 and Type
3), the top three foreign countries where the direct owners are located are
Germany (12.6%), Switzerland (10.9%) and Luxembourg (10.0%). Figure
13 and Figure 14 presents the box plot of the five most frequent coun-
tries of the ultimate and direct owners of the FISs. The rankings of aver-
age labour productivity by the location of direct and ultimate owners are
shown in Table 35 in Appendix 3.6. On average, subsidiaries owned by
firms in Luxembourg, Netherlands and Germany are more productive
than in other foreign countries. Though quite a number of subsidiaries
are directly or indirectly owned by firms in Switzerland, their productiv-
ity is below the average.
Among the 13,186 FISs, 66.0% of them belong to Type 3. Type 1 and
Type 2 represent respectively 23.4% and 10.6% of the sample. Figure
12 shows that firms of Type 2 on average are slightly more productive
than the other two types. Table 27, 28 and 29 report the top 10 countries
where the ultimate owners of the FISs are located and the FISs’ average
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Figure 10: Frequency of Ultimate Owner of FIS by Country
Figure 11: Frequency of Direct Owner of FIS by Country
59
productivity. We notice that US ultimate owners represent 6.9% of all
the three types, but take up to 16.3% of the sample of Type 2, which
implies that more of them control Italian subsidiaries through firms in
another jurisdiction. On the other hand, Luxembourg ultimate owners
represent 11.8% of the overall sample but only 5.8% of the sample of
Type 2, which means most of them control directly Italian subsidiaries
rather than through firms in a third country.
Figure 12: Labour Productivity (log) by Different Types of FIS
We further explore the location of the direct owners of Type 2. For
each of the 5 most frequent countries of the ultimate owners, Table 30
presents the 3 most frequent countries of the direct owners. We notice
that most of these direct owners are located in Germany and UK.
3.4 Results and Discussion
Table 31 reports the regression results of the comparison of differ-
ent categories of firms. The group of domestic-owned MNEs is used as
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Table 27: Type 1 of FIS’s Labour Productivity (log) by Ultimate Owners’
Location
Rank Country Frequency Percentage Mean Std
1 Luxembourg 585 18.95% 4.505 1.667
2 Netherlands 509 16.49% 4.642 1.381
3 France 500 16.20% 4.294 1.528
4 Switzerland 221 7.16% 4.366 1.539
5 Germany 215 6.96% 4.617 1.397
6 United States 212 6.87% 4.336 1.053
7 Great Britain 170 5.51% 4.006 1.123
8 Spain 75 2.43% 4.081 1.529
9 Austria 32 1.04% 4.124 1.134
10 Japan 24 0.78% 4.388 1.039
Table 28: Type 2 of FIS’s Labour Productivity (log) by Ultimate Owners’
Location
Rank Country Frequency Percentage Mean Std
1 United States 228 16.32% 4.507 0.827
2 Netherlands 147 10.52% 4.500 0.784
3 Germany 90 6.44% 5.068 1.464
4 Luxembourg 81 5.80% 4.398 0.929
5 Great Britain 71 5.08% 5.147 1.500
6 Japan 71 5.08% 4.504 0.571
7 Switzerland 55 3.94% 4.292 1.220
8 France 38 2.72% 4.751 1.355
9 Belgium 24 1.72% 4.838 1.173
10 Austria 19 1.36% 4.361 0.593
Table 29: Type 3 of FIS’s Labour Productivity (log) by Ultimate Owners’
Location
Rank Country Frequency Percentage Mean Std
1 Germany 1065 12.24% 4.262 1.052
2 Switzerland 984 11.31% 3.646 1.161
3 Luxembourg 890 10.23% 4.557 1.581
4 Netherlands 776 8.92% 4.568 1.094
5 France 630 7.24% 4.108 1.044
6 Great Britain 507 5.83% 3.774 1.179
7 United States 474 5.45% 4.196 1.028
8 Spain 358 4.11% 4.032 1.275
9 China 275 3.16% 2.991 1.026
10 Austria 233 2.68% 4.180 1.041
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Table 30: Type 2 of FIS’s Labour Productivity (log) by Direct Owners’ Loca-
tion
R
an
k
U
lt
im
at
e
ow
ne
r
M
ea
n
D
ir
ec
to
w
ne
r
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
M
ea
n
St
d
1
U
ni
te
d
St
at
es
4.
50
7
G
re
at
Br
it
ai
n
65
28
.5
1%
4.
26
0
0.
82
7
Fr
an
ce
37
16
.2
3%
4.
47
2
0.
63
3
G
er
m
an
y
27
11
.8
4%
4.
70
6
0.
87
7
2
N
et
he
rl
an
ds
4.
50
0
G
er
m
an
y
32
21
.7
7%
4.
73
6
0.
63
8
G
re
at
Br
it
ai
n
24
16
.3
3%
4.
67
8
1.
19
1
Fr
an
ce
22
14
.9
7%
4.
32
4
0.
76
1
3
G
er
m
an
y
5.
06
8
Sw
it
ze
rl
an
d
25
27
.7
8%
4.
30
0
0.
62
9
A
us
tr
ia
23
25
.5
6%
5.
67
2
1.
71
5
G
re
at
Br
it
ai
n
14
15
.5
6%
5.
93
2
2.
26
6
4
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
4.
39
8
Fr
an
ce
24
29
.6
3%
4.
54
5
1.
25
1
G
er
m
an
y
14
17
.2
8%
4.
38
3
0.
48
37
G
re
at
Br
it
ai
n
13
16
.0
5%
4.
56
4
0.
65
3
5
G
re
at
Br
it
ai
n
5.
14
7
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
21
29
.5
8%
6.
37
8
2.
14
8
G
er
m
an
y
15
21
.1
3%
4.
59
7
0.
41
2
Fr
an
ce
11
15
.4
9%
4.
73
0
0.
79
2
5
Ja
pa
n
4.
50
4
G
er
m
an
y
23
32
.3
9%
4.
51
8
0.
33
4
G
re
at
Br
it
ai
n
17
23
.9
4%
4.
50
7
0.
72
1
Be
lg
iu
m
13
18
.3
1%
4.
41
3
0.
77
4
62
the baseline. The results in column 1 show that the category of foreign-
owned subsidiaries is significant and takes a positive sign while that of
the purely domestic groups is significant and takes a negative sign. We
further restrict the sample to only the manufacturing sector, and the re-
sults shown in columns 2 are in line with the previous ones. The find-
ings suggest that the MNEs in Italy are on average more productive than
the domestic groups, and the foreign-owned Italian subsidiaries are even
more productive than the Italian firms involved in the domestic-owned
MNEs. We also make some robustness checks by using the sales per
employee as the dependent variable. The results shown in Table 368 in
Appendix 3.6 are consistent with the findings here.
Table 32 presents the regression results of the comparison of differ-
ent types of foreign-owned Italian subsidiaries. Using firms of Type 3 as
benchmark, we find that in both specifications the coefficient of Type 1
is significant and negative and that of Type 2 is positive, though not sig-
nificant when restricting the sample to manufacturing firms. The results
indicate that the Italian subsidiaries directly owned by another domes-
tic firm are less productive than the ones directly owned by a foreign
firm. We make a robustness check by using the sales per employee as the
dependent variable, and the results (see Table 37 in Appendix 3.6) are
consistent.
Table 33 reports the regression results of model 3.2. The number of
steps to the closest foreign owner in the control network is always signif-
icant and takes a negative sign in all the specifications, which suggests
that the Italian subsidiaries with shorter organizational distance from
their foreign owners are on average more productive. What’s more, we
notice that whether the closest foreign owner in the corporate structure
is in the EU countries is significant and positive, implying that shorter
geographical distance from the foreign owner is also a premium. We
also control the dummy variable whether the ultimate owner is in the
8As mentioned before, we shift the number of employees by adding 1 to all firms in the
previous analysis. As a robustness check, here we adopt the original value of number of
employees in the regression and in defining the labour productivity. We drop the observa-
tions with the number of employees smaller than 3 and larger than 10,000. In Table 38 and
Table 39, the regression also adopts the original value of number of employees.
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Table 31: Comparison of Different Categories of Firms
Dependent variable: log of labour productivity
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Overall Manufacturing
foreign-owned subsidiaries 0.178*** 0.0769***
(0.0258) (0.0186)
purely domestic BGs -0.0590*** -0.0343***
(0.0167) (0.0133)
standalone -0.153*** -0.134***
(0.0216) (0.0166)
other 0.0208 0.0251
(0.0215) (0.0163)
log No. employees 0.217*** 0.226***
(0.00147) (0.00252)
log capital intensity 0.163*** 0.128***
(0.000716) (0.00154)
age 0.00419*** 0.00273***
(0.000114) (0.000222)
log group size 0.0909*** 0.0524***
(0.0111) (0.00599)
sector Yes Yes
regions Yes Yes
Constant 2.223*** 2.332***
(0.0212) (0.0187)
Observations 554,890 101,409
R-squared 0.244 0.306
Notes: 1. In the regression we remove the firms in the 1% upper and lower tail of
labour productivity and the firms with no sector and region information.
2. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
3. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 32: Comparison of Different Types of FIS
Dependent variable: log of labour productivity
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Overall Manufacturing
Type 1 -0.0859*** -0.0988***
(0.0313) (0.0337)
Type 2 0.0971*** 0.0626
(0.0350) (0.0398)
control domestic subsidiaries 0.00552 0.0675
(0.0314) (0.0483)
control foreign subsidiaries -0.119*** -0.060*
(0.0336) (0.0359)
log No. employees 0.0851*** 0.0835***
(0.0121) (0.0125)
log capital intensity 0.108*** 0.0632***
(0.00535) (0.00902)
age 0.00399*** 0.00368***
(0.000636) (0.000755)
log group size 0.109*** 0.0773***
(0.0174) (0.0117)
sector Yes Yes
regions Yes Yes
Constant 2.856*** 3.248***
(0.0540) (0.0730)
Observations 12,362 2,856
R-squared 0.201 0.189
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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EU countries but find it not significant. In addition, the dummy variable
of whether the nationality of the closest foreign owner is equal to that
of the ultimate owner is found to be significant and negative in the first
two specifications. The results reveal that the Italian subsidiaries with
multiple cross-border links in the upstream ownership chain are more
productive, which further support the previous findings that Type 2 out-
performs the other two types.
Table 33: Regression Results Related to the Closest Foreign Owner
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Overall Manufacturing Overall Manufacturing
steps to closest foreign -0.0795*** -0.0808*** -0.0725*** -0.0717***
(0.0201) (0.0232) (0.0208) (0.0231)
closest foreign in EU 0.224*** 0.186***
(0.0210) (0.0311)
closest foreign equal uo -0.0808* -0.0709**
(0.0444) (0.0359)
control domestic subsidiaries 0.00524 0.0671 0.00473 0.0677
(0.0313) (0.0476) (0.0317) (0.0485)
control foreign subsidiaries -0.111*** -0.0530 -0.118*** -0.0577
(0.0331) (0.0355) (0.0337) (0.0361)
log No. employees 0.0802*** 0.0766*** 0.0843*** 0.0827***
(0.0126) (0.0127) (0.0118) (0.0124)
log capital intensity 0.106*** 0.0641*** 0.108*** 0.0632***
(0.00529) (0.00901) (0.00534) (0.00902)
age 0.00401*** 0.00360*** 0.00404*** 0.00371***
(0.000637) (0.000746) (0.000638) (0.000752)
log group size 0.101*** 0.0713*** 0.109*** 0.0747***
(0.0182) (0.0117) (0.0192) (0.0122)
sector Yes Yes Yes Yes
regions Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 2.832*** 3.251*** 3.015*** 3.388***
(0.0570) (0.0787) (0.0674) (0.0845)
Observations 12,362 2,856 12,362 2,856
R-squared 0.210 0.200 0.201 0.189
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we empirically investigate the relationship between
foreign ownership and firm performance from diverse perspectives us-
ing the data of Italian firms. We find that the foreign-owned Italian firms
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are on average more productive than the ones in domestic-owned Italian
MNEs. Moreover, we notice that the Italian subsidiaries with shorter or-
ganizational or geographical distance from their foreign owners are on
average more productive. In addition, subsidiaries with multiple cross-
border links in the upstream ownership chain are found to be more pro-
ductive.
The results of this work are limited to the Italian firms based on cross-
section data. As mentioned in the previous chapter, it is difficult to trace
the change of ownership structure over time, which limits us to perform
more profound econometric analysis. In the future we will collect the
financial data of firms in other countries and extend our analysis to the
global scale. By doing so we can explore the difference of firm perfor-
mance in different countries and provide more policy implications for
global investors.
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3.6 Appendix
3.6.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 34: Labour Productivity (log) by Different Categories of Firms
category No. Obs Freq. Mean Std. Dev.
firms in domestic MNE 14,184 2.51% 4.151 1.192
foreign-owned subsidiaries 13,186 2.33% 4.103 1.322
firms in domestic BG 262,109 46.41% 3.281 1.045
stand-alone 133,598 23.66% 2.973 1.192
other 141,693 25.09% 3.276 1.020
overall 564,770 100% 3.248 1.112
Table 35: Labour Productivity (log) by the Location of Direct and Ultimate
Owner of FIS
Ultimate owner Direct owner
Rank Country mean std Rank Country mean std
1 Netherlands 4.587 1.179 1 Luxembourg 4.615 1.574
2 Luxembourg 4.529 1.587 2 Netherlands 4.567 1.091
3 Germany 4.371 1.164 3 Italy 4.391 1.452
4 Japan 4.322 0.788 4 Germany 4.334 1.057
5 United States 4.306 0.996 5 Austria 4.317 1.161
6 France 4.208 1.289 6 Belgium 4.236 1.080
7 Austria 4.186 1.026 7 United States 4.200 1.021
8 Sweden 4.150 0.801 8 Denmark 4.200 1.168
9 Belgium 4.140 1.084 9 Sweden 4.187 0.784
10 Denmark 4.103 1.194 10 France 4.185 0.994
11 Spain 4.046 1.319 11 Spain 4.083 1.210
12 Great Britain 3.957 1.263 12 Great Britain 3.905 1.234
13 Switzerland 3.801 1.271 13 Switzerland 3.724 1.137
14 China 3.161 1.210 14 China 3.001 1.030
15 Romania 2.889 0.762 15 Romania 2.891 0.766
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Figure 13: Labour Productivity (log) by Ultimate Owner Nationality of FIS
Figure 14: Labour Productivity (log) by Direct Owner Nationality of FIS
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3.6.2 Robustness Check 1: Using Sales per Employee as
Dependent Variable
Table 36: Comparison of Different Categories of Firms
Dependent variable: log of sales per employee
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Overall Manufacturing
foreign-owned subsidiaries 0.0680** 0.0890***
(0.0302) (0.0227)
purely domestic BGs -0.234*** -0.198***
(0.0188) (0.0159)
standalone -0.362*** -0.250***
(0.0241) (0.0211)
other -0.142*** -0.0922***
(0.0241) (0.0207)
log No. employees 0.0402*** 0.111***
(0.00182) (0.00287)
log capital intensity 0.109*** 0.131***
(0.000797) (0.00177)
age 0.00585*** 0.00322***
(0.000135) (0.000281)
log group size 0.0973*** 0.0846***
(0.0135) (0.00936)
sector Yes Yes
regions Yes Yes
Constant 4.388*** 3.929***
(0.0234) (0.0228)
Observations 537,537 100,097
R-squared 0.178 0.199
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 37: Comparison of Different Types of FIS
Dependent variable: log of sales per employee
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Overall Manufacturing
Type 1 -0.0759** -0.136***
(0.0323) (0.0389)
Type 2 0.0996*** 0.0960**
(0.0342) (0.0456)
control domestic subsidiaries 0.0572* 0.167***
(0.0341) (0.0573)
control foreign subsidiaries 0.0292 -0.0346
(0.0371) (0.0411)
log No. employees 0.0588*** 0.0454***
(0.0103) (0.0138)
log capital intensity 0.0756*** 0.0833***
(0.00498) (0.00999)
age 0.00575*** 0.00324***
(0.000669) (0.000882)
log group size 0.0862*** 0.0755***
(0.0145) (0.0127)
sector Yes Yes
regions Yes Yes
Constant 4.485*** 4.478***
(0.0578) (0.0958)
Observations 12,319 2,812
R-squared 0.182 0.133
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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3.6.3 Robustness Check 2: Using Original Number of Em-
ployees
Table 38: Comparison of Different Categories of Firms
Dependent variable: log of labour productivity.
Sample: No. employees (original) between 3 and 10000.
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Overall Manufacturing
foreign-owned subsidiaries 0.164*** 0.0709***
(0.0215) (0.0188)
purely domestic BGs -0.142*** -0.0844***
(0.0130) (0.0130)
standalone -0.253*** -0.170***
(0.0169) (0.0169)
other -0.0667*** -0.0278*
(0.0167) (0.0165)
log No. employees 0.0452*** 0.105***
(0.00184) (0.00284)
log capital intensity 0.131*** 0.117***
(0.000924) (0.00169)
age 0.00712*** 0.00304***
(0.000172) (0.000253)
log group size 0.106*** 0.0660***
(0.00934) (0.00702)
sector Yes Yes
regions Yes Yes
Constant 2.832*** 2.830***
(0.0168) (0.0190)
Observations 308,078 81,702
R-squared 0.255 0.244
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 39: Comparison of Different Types of FIS
Dependent variable: log of labour productivity.
Sample: No. employees (original) between 3 and 10000.
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Overall Manufacturing
Type 1 -0.0951*** -0.108***
(0.0266) (0.0331)
Type 2 0.0910*** 0.0406
(0.0254) (0.0382)
control domestic subsidiaries 0.0343 0.0698
(0.0294) (0.0471)
control foreign subsidiaries 0.0123 -0.0246
(0.0313) (0.0362)
log No. employees -0.00279 0.0265**
(0.00851) (0.0122)
log capital intensity 0.0515*** 0.0500***
(0.00521) (0.00868)
age 0.00689*** 0.00345***
(0.000589) (0.000736)
log group size 0.0976*** 0.0789***
(0.00888) (0.0112)
Constant 3.310*** 3.552***
(0.0621) (0.0776)
sector Yes Yes
regions Yes Yes
Observations 8,642 2,661
R-squared 0.163 0.127
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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3.6.4 Robustness Check 3: Results of the New Algorithm
Though there is no information on the ownership type in the original
data, we perform a new algorithm to further identify the possible links
between non-company (individual, family or state) and company (see
details in 2.6.6). As illustrated in Figure 7, some firms belonging to type
(c) before are classified as type (a) in the new algorithm. Thus, we use
the nationality of the parent company A1 instead of that of the ultimate
beneficial owner A in the classification of MNEs and FISs. For types
(b) and (c), we use respectively the nationality of the ultimate beneficial
owner B and the parent company C1 for classification as in the main text.
The frequency of the new classification of firms is displayed in Table 40
and Table 41. The main difference of the classification results lie in that
a majority of the firms belonging to a group of size 2 before are now
classified as standalone ones. Nevertheless, the main regression results
of the two algorithms in this chapter are consistent (see Table 42, Table 43
and Table 44). It should be noticed that this new algorithm may overly
drop some ownership links actually by companies or institutions whose
shareholders data are not covered by ORBIS. The results reported here
only aim to provide further support for our findings in this chapter.
Table 40: Labour Productivity (log) by Different Categories of Firms
category No. Obs Freq. Mean Std. Dev.
firms in domestic MNE 14,429 2.55% 4.151 1.192
foreign-owned subsidiaries 7,922 1.40% 4.350 1.235
firms in domestic BG 80,936 14.33% 3.651 1.131
stand-alone 319,790 56.02% 3.066 1.075
other 141,693 25.09% 3.276 1.020
overall 564,770 100% 3.248 1.112
Table 41: Labour Productivity (log) by Different Categories of Firms
category No. Obs Freq. Mean Std. Dev.
Type 1 2,318 29.26% 4.389 1.395
Type 2 876 11.06% 4.539 0.999
Type 3 4,728 59.68% 4.296 1.187
overall 7,922 100% 4.350 1.235
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Table 42: Comparison of Different Categories of Firms
Dependent variable: log of labour productivity
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Overall Manufacturing
foreign-owned subsidiaries 0.280*** 0.128***
(0.0161) (0.0222)
purely domestic BGs -0.0718*** 0.0138
(0.0114) (0.0138)
other -0.173*** -0.0858***
(0.0134) (0.0161)
standalone -0.283*** -0.191***
(0.0134) (0.0160)
log No. employees 0.193*** 0.210***
(0.00131) (0.00271)
log capital intensity 0.189*** 0.137***
(0.000796) (0.00174)
age 0.00340*** 0.00251***
(0.000117) (0.000225)
log group size 0.0744*** 0.0251***
(0.00378) (0.00548)
sector Yes Yes
regions Yes Yes
Constant 2.387*** 2.445***
(0.0142) (0.0190)
Observations 563,193 101,884
R-squared 0.257 0.293
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 43: Comparison of Different Types of FIS
Dependent variable: log of labour productivity
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Overall Manufacturing
Type 1 -0.164*** -0.118***
(0.0259) (0.0348)
Type 2 0.0976*** 0.0760*
(0.0292) (0.0423)
control domestic subsidiaries -0.0132 0.0805
(0.0357) (0.0517)
control foreign subsidiaries -0.0554 -0.0192
(0.0352) (0.0433)
log No. employees 0.0388*** 0.0447***
(0.00766) (0.0133)
log capital intensity 0.0891*** 0.0392***
(0.00558) (0.0101)
age 0.00314*** 0.00257***
(0.000663) (0.000843)
log group size 0.0749*** 0.0510***
(0.00663) (0.0102)
sector Yes Yes
regions Yes Yes
Constant 3.381*** 3.698***
(0.0639) (0.0884)
Observations 7,357 1,894
R-squared 0.134 0.086
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 44: Regression Results Related to the Closest Foreign Owner
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Overall Manufacturing Overall Manufacturing
steps to closest foreign -0.129*** -0.0854*** -0.118*** -0.0773***
(0.0179) (0.0229) (0.0180) (0.0230)
closest foreign in EU 0.136*** 0.0889**
(0.0264) (0.0378)
closest foreign equal uo -0.115*** -0.0723*
(0.0261) (0.0376)
control domestic subsidiaries -0.0189 0.0797 -0.0126 0.0819
(0.0357) (0.0513) (0.0358) (0.0518)
control foreign subsidiaries -0.0478 -0.0156 -0.0487 -0.0144
(0.0353) (0.0434) (0.0354) (0.0438)
log No. employees 0.0352*** 0.0419*** 0.0365*** 0.0437***
(0.00769) (0.0135) (0.00766) (0.0134)
log capital intensity 0.0876*** 0.0392*** 0.0890*** 0.0392***
(0.00555) (0.0101) (0.00558) (0.0101)
age 0.00324*** 0.00256*** 0.00322*** 0.00262***
(0.000661) (0.000840) (0.000662) (0.000842)
log group size 0.0769*** 0.0530*** 0.0721*** 0.0481***
(0.00651) (0.0100) (0.00684) (0.0106)
sector Yes Yes Yes Yes
regions Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 3.430*** 3.720*** 3.626*** 3.842***
(0.0695) (0.0975) (0.0716) (0.101)
Observations 7,357 1,894 7,357 1,894
R-squared 0.136 0.085 0.134 0.084
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Chapter 4
On the Optimal Marketing
Aggressiveness Level of
C2C Sellers in Social
Media: Evidence from
China
4.1 Introduction
Built on the Web 2.0 technology, social media is the kind of appli-
cations that allow the creation and exchange of User Generated Con-
tent (UGC) on the Internet. It includes collaborative projects such as
Wikipedia, social networking sites such as Facebook, microblogging plat-
forms such as Twitter, and visual content communities such as YouTube.
More recently, Mobile Web 2.0 (i.e., Web 2.0 evolution with mobile de-
vices) expands the scope of social media to an unprecedented scale (Ka-
plan and Haenlein, 2010). For example, an increasing number of mer-
chants have employed social media as a marketing tool in electronic com-
merce. They can promote their goods by simply posting a message, usu-
ally containing pictures, links, and a short description of them. Com-
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pared with the traditional marketing channels, social media has pro-
vided a more efficient and economic way for sellers to reach potential
customers. What’s more, sellers can get feedback in real time and gain
a better understanding of customers’ demands through their likes and
comments, i.e., the popularity of microblogs (De Vries et al., 2012).
Not only sellers benefit from social media marketing, but customers
gain gratifications as well. By reading the microblogs, they can get in-
formation of the products they need. However, customers use social net-
works also for social connection and entertainment (Lin and Lu, 2011).
While they appreciate a moderate level of marketing communication on
products, customers may get annoyed of a marketer if she is too aggres-
sive in promoting her products.
Previous literature has mainly focused on the gratification brought by
social media (Kaplan and Haenlein, 2010; Mangold and Faulds, 2009).
Some works have pointed out people’s negative attitude towards ag-
gressive social media (and online) marketing by making survey (Akar
and Topc¸u, 2011; Grant, 2005) and investigated the factors driving cus-
tomers’ engagement with marketing information (Bauer et al., 2005; Chu
and Choi, 2011; Chu and Kim, 2011; Tsai and Men, 2013). However, to
the best of our knowledge, no one has empirically provided an optimal
marketing aggressiveness level in social media.
This work attempts to fill the gap by analysing the data of Taobao
(China’s largest C2C e-commerce platform, similar to eBay and Amazon)
sellers on Sina Weibo1 (China’s largest microblogging platform, similar
to Twitter). In particular, this chapter contributes to the few literature
on C2C sellers’ behaviour in social media. Prior studies on social me-
dia marketing are by and large confined to business-to-customer (B2C)
(Kumar and Mirchandani, 2012; Rapp et al., 2013; Taylor et al., 2011),
business-to-business (B2B) (Michaelidou et al., 2011; Swani et al., 2014;
Wiersema, 2013), and eWOM between customers (Chu and Choi, 2011;
Chu and Kim, 2011; King et al., 2014). This is mainly due to the prac-
tical difficulty of studying C2C business in social media. On the one
hand, unlike firms that can be searched by their brand names, C2C sell-
1Some recent studies on Sina Weibo include Guan et al. (2014); He and Song (2015).
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ers have little additional information to be found in social media. On the
other hand, it is rare that a large number of C2C sellers from the same e-
commerce platform use the same social media platform to promote their
products. The dispersed distribution of social media platforms they use
make their behaviour less comparable.
Thanks to the collaboration between Taobao and Sina Weibo, the dif-
ficulty of studying C2C business in social media can be overcome. On
August 5, 2013, Sina Weibo collaborated with Taobao, and released a new
module specifically designed for Taobao sellers. The new module gives
the verified Taobao sellers additional capabilities (compared to other reg-
ular Sina Weibo users) to promote their merchandise. More importantly,
it grants the verified Taobao sellers an identity of “Tao”, which is high-
lighted in their Sina Weibo profiles.2 What’s more, in January, 2014, Sina
Weibo has cooperated with Alipay (Taobao and Alipay are both sub-
sidiaries of Alibaba Group) to launch a new platform called Weibo Pay-
ment, making payment much easier for Sina Weibo users. These policies
have encouraged more Taobao sellers to create accounts on Sina Weibo
and to make full use of this marketing channel. The gathering of Taobao
sellers on Sina Weibo gives us a unique opportunity to analyse their mar-
keting behaviour and to provide marketing strategies for them. Such
marketing strategies would be of great importance for C2C sellers since
they cannot afford to market through the traditional channels such as TV,
newspapers and magazines.
We identify the 52,187 Taobao sellers on Sina Weibo and collect their
microblogs in November 2014. For the 12,744 sellers who add the links of
their Taobao shop, we further track their microblogs from July to October
in 2016. For each seller, we use the proportion of her marketing-related
microblogs to measure her marketing aggressiveness. To define whether
a microblog is about marketing, we employ different machine learning
algorithms to a training set of 5,000 manually labelled microblogs. The
Multinomial Naive Bayes classifier has the best performance and is thus
2The minimum requirement for applying for an identity of “Tao” is that the virtual
store owner in Taobao should have the level of credibility of at least “one diamond,” see
http://help.weibo.com/newtopic/taobao/list/1770/1772 for more details.
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used to classify all the rest microblogs. Defining the marketing popular-
ity as the average number of likes a seller receives per marketing-related
microblog, we conjecture that the relationship between the marketing
aggressiveness level and the marketing popularity can be depicted as
an inverted U-shaped curve. By performing different models to explore
their relationship, we find the linear regression model using Yeo-Johnson
transformation of the number of followers has the best performance. Af-
ter multiple tests, we empirically confirm that there is an inverted U-
shape relationship between the marketing aggressiveness level and the
marketing popularity. Specifically, the optimal proportion of marketing
microblogs is around 0.3.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. In Section 4.2
we present the conceptual framework and hypothesis. Then Section 4.3
discusses the design of the study, the algorithms to classify microblogs
and the models to explore the relation between the marketing aggres-
siveness level and the marketing popularity. In Section 4.4, we provide
the estimation results and analysis of them. Finally, Section 4.5 concludes
the work.
4.2 Conceptual Framework
In this section we present the conceptual framework of our study. We
define the marketing popularity as the average number of likes that a
seller receives per marketing-related microblog over the observation pe-
riod. The proportion of marketing-related microblogs that a seller posts
is used to measure her marketing aggressiveness level. We assume that
a too low proportion of marketing microblogs cannot satisfy potential
customers’ needs of being informed about products whereas a too high
level of marketing microblogs may make people annoyed.
4.2.1 Marketing Popularity
The growth of social network sites has supported the increase of UGC
social media communication (Gangadharbatla, 2008). New ideas to mon-
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etize social networks and UGC are pushing more and more sellers to cre-
ate public accounts on social media, enabling them with a novel way to
market their products. By leveraging the power of electronic word-of-
mouth (eWOM), sellers can disseminate the news of their products to a
large number of potential customers. Moreover, customers can interact
with sellers and publicly state their opinions by liking, commenting, and
forwarding (retweet) their microblogs.
Previous studies use the number of likes, comments, and forwards
to measure the popularity of microblogs (De Vries et al., 2012; Yu et al.,
2011). Since a user can comment or forward a microblog as many times
as she wants while she can only like a microblog once on Sina Weibo,
we adopt the number of likes as the measure of popularity in our study.
More importantly, we consider the likes that sellers receive only for the
microblogs related to marketing behaviour because they can directly re-
flect the purchase intention of potential customers.
We define that the marketing popularity of seller i as the average
number of likes received per marketing-related microblog:
marketing popularityi =
No. likes received from marketing microblogsi
No. marketing microblogsi
Schivinski and Dabrowski (2014) argue that high level of popularity
has a positive influence on brand equity and brand attitude, which in
turn shows a positive influence on purchase intention. Hence, the pop-
ularity of microblogs is of crucial importance to sellers. They must have
a good knowledge of the factors that can affect the popularity of their
microblogs and find strategy to improve their popularity.
4.2.2 Marketing Aggressiveness Level
Our work is also related to the longstanding literature of uses and
gratifications (U&G) theory (Eighmey and McCord, 1998; Katz et al.,
1973; Ruggiero, 2000). In principle, potential customers can gain grat-
ifications by interacting with both marketing microblogs (i.e., being in-
formed or educated about products and services) and non-marketing mi-
croblogs (i.e., being connected in social life).
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We define that the marketing aggressiveness level of seller i as the
proportion of marketing microblogs she posts:
marketing aggressiveness leveli =
No. marketing microblogsi
No. all microblogsi
Given a moderate aggressive level of marketing, potential customers
can gain both social and business benefits and are more likely to interact
with sellers. However, if the microblogs are solely focused on business,
followers may get annoyed because they use social networks also for
social connection and entertainment (Lin and Lu, 2011). On the other
hand, the microblogs cannot be solely focused on regular social inter-
actions because at least some of them are supposed to attract potential
customers. Therefore, either extreme of the spectrum will likely decrease
customers’ gratifications and discourage them from liking the marketing
microblogs. We state below formally our hypothesis on the relationship
between the marketing aggressiveness level and the marketing popular-
ity.
Hypothesis: The relationship between the marketing aggressiveness
level and the marketing popularity can be depicted as an inverted U-
shape curve and there exists an optimal marketing aggressiveness level
to achieve the maximum popularity.
4.2.3 Control Variables
We control other variables that may affect the marketing popularity
such as whether the seller’s identity has been verified, gender, the num-
ber of followers and the average number of pictures posted per market-
ing microblog.
The verification of identities provides a signal of trust and reputation.
The importance of trust in e-commerce has long been emphasized in pre-
vious studies (Gefen, 2000; Gefen and Straub, 2004; Hajli, 2014; Hoffman
et al., 1999). Trust is a major factor that affects the prosperity and suc-
cess of e-commerce because in such a virtual environment, participants
are usually anonymous and do not engage in direct face-to-face commu-
nication (Lu et al., 2010). What’s more, the growing number of fraudu-
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lent practices further increases customers’ concerns to adopt e-commerce
(Lek et al., 2001). Hence, trust is a crucial element of e-commerce (Cofta,
2006; Kim et al., 2009; Pentina et al., 2013). Enhancing the degree of trust
in an online seller can increase people’s intentions to purchase prod-
ucts on that seller’s website (Gefen, 2000). Moreover, high levels of trust
can help maintain long-term relationships between businesses and cus-
tomers (Hoffman et al., 1999; Reichheld and Schefter, 2000).
Since its collaboration with Taobao, Sina Weibo grants the verified
Taobao sellers an identity of “Tao”3, which is highlighted in their Sina
Weibo profiles. Furthermore, like Twitter, Sina Weibo also supports ver-
ification for individuals or entities4. After being approved, the verified
user will have a “V”5 identity in the profile. We believe that both the
“Tao” and “V” identity can provide a signal of trust, and customers are
more inclined to interact more with the verified sellers. Furthermore,
since the verification of identities is associated with some thresholds of
credibility and prestige6, it can also be a proxy of other unmeasurable
factors such as the quality of service. Hence, we assume that the sellers
with verified identities can gain more popularity in social media.
Moreover, we expect that the number of followers have a positive ef-
fect on a seller’s marketing popularity (Wang and Jin, 2010), so as the av-
erage number of pictures posted per marketing microblog (De Vries et al.,
2012; Fortin and Dholakia, 2005). Some studies have also suggested the
gender differences in online activity on Sina Weibo (Guan et al., 2014; Li
et al., 2015) and we control the dummy variable of gender in our analysis
as well.
3The minimum requirement for applying for an identity of “Tao” is that the virtual
store owner in Taobao should have the level of credibility of at least “one diamond,” see
http://help.weibo.com/newtopic/taobao/list/1770/1772 for more details.
4There are a number of requirements such as the number of followers being at least
100 and the number of followees being at least 30, see http://verified.weibo.com/
verify/help?fr=home&frpos=leftnav for more details.
5Sina Weibo accepts voluntary requests from the elite of 34 categories and 542 profes-
sions which include electronic retailers (see http://verified.weibo.com/verify/
applystd?fr=home&frpos=morestd for more details).
6See footnotes 4 and 5 above.
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4.3 Method
4.3.1 Sample
First, we identify the Taobao sellers on the microblog platform Sina
Weibo in November 2014 using data scraping techniques. We select this
period because November 11 (a.k.a. Singles’ Day7), the largest online
shopping day in the world8 occurs in this month. We believe that the
Taobao sellers have substantial economic incentives to post marketing
microblogs during this period. Taking advantage of the search function
of Sina Weibo, we find 281,160 profiles including the Chinese characters
“Taobao” in their personal labels. However, apart from the 19,309 users
with a verified “Tao” badge, we cannot make sure whether all the other
users are real Taobao sellers or just fond of shopping on Taobao website.
Hence, we retain only the users who add a link of Taobao shop or at
least one of the Chinese words meaning Taobao seller9 in their personal
tags. Finally we identify 52,187 Taobao sellers and collected the 465,812
microblogs they posted in November 2014.
As a quality check, we explore the geographical distribution of the
Taobao sellers in our sample. It fits our intuition that a good sample
can reflect to some extent the local economic situation. As Figure 15
shows, most of the Taobao sellers live in Guangdong, the province with
its GDP ranking first in China in 2014.10 Sellers from Guangdong take
up 18.45% of the observations in our sample, while sellers from Xizang,
the province with the lowest GDP in China, represent only 0.05% of the
sample. We find that the ranking of the number of regional Taobao sell-
ers and the ranking of provincial GDP are highly correlated (see Figure
16), with a correlation coefficient of 0.901. Based on these facts, we be-
lieve that our data is a representative sample with regard to geographical
7Singles’ Day is a day for people who are single, celebrated on November 11 (11/11).
The date is chosen for the connection between singles and the number “1”. This holiday
has become popular in recent years among young Chinese people.
8The sales of Alibaba’s sites Tmall and Taobao are $9.3 billion on November 11th, 2014.
9See some examples in Figure 23.
10Data source is from http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2014/zk/html/
Z0314e.htm.
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distribution.
Figure 15: The Geographical Distribution of Taobao sellers on Sina Weibo
Among the 52,187 sellers we identify on Sina Weibo in 2014, only
12,744 sellers add the links of their Taobao shop. We further track these
sellers and collect the 308,167 microblogs they posted from July to Octo-
ber in 2016.
4.3.2 Classification of Microblogs
A traditional text classification framework comprises preprocessing,
feature extraction, feature selection and classification steps (Allahyari
et al., 2017). In the preprocessing step, we first randomly select 5,000
out of the 774,429 microblogs and manually label them as “marketing”
and “non-marketing”. We employ these microblogs to train the classi-
fiers so as to predict the label of all the microblogs.11 The second process
is tokenization, which is a task of breaking a character sequence and a
defined document unit into pieces such as words, phrases, symbols and
other elements called tokens (Manning and Schutze., 2008). Taking the
11We also adopt a simple classification approach by checking whether a microblog con-
tains at least one of the most frequent words related to marketing. See the details in Ap-
pendix 4.6.6.
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Figure 16: The Rankings of Regional GDP and Number of Taobao Sellers on
Sina Weibo
advantage of the package ”jieba” in python which is designed for Chi-
nese words segmentation, we split each of the 5,000 microblogs into a
list of words.
Most machine learning algorithms require numerical feature vectors
with a fixed size rather than the raw texts with variable length. Hence,
we need to extract numerical features from the contents instead of us-
ing the symbols directly. An intuitive way is to assign a weight to each
word in a given document. We here adopt the method of term frequency
- inverse document frequency (TF-IDF), which is a numerical statistic that
is intended to reflect how important a word is to a document in a cor-
pus (Leskovec et al., 2014; Salton and Buckley, 1988). In this step we
filter out some stop words12 and the words that appear only once13. In
our case, each row in the TF-IDF matrix A represents a microblog d and
12The stop words refer to some extremely common words that would appear to be of
little value in helping select documents matching a user’s need (Manning and Schutze.,
2008).
13This step is executed using the TfidfVectorizer function in the sklearn module in python.
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each column corresponds to a word t. The term frequency tf(t, d) is the
number of times that word t appears in the microblog d. The inverse doc-
ument frequency idf(t) is equal to log(N+1nt+1 ) + 1, where N is the number
of microblogs and nt is the number of microblogs containing word t. The
corresponding value for word t in microblog d in the matrixA is defined
asA(t, d) = tf(t, d) ∗ idf(t). Table 45 presents several rows and columns
of the TF-IDF matrix of our sample. The TF-IDF matrix will be used as
inputs to predict the label of the microblogs in the next procedures.
Table 45: Term Frequency-Inverse Document Frequency Matrix
Terms http 11 purchasing agent really new fashion · · ·
label Documents
0 microblog 1 0.173 0 0 0 0 · · ·
1 microblog 2 0.069 0.182 0 0 0.201 · · ·
1 microblog 3 0 0 0.192 0 0 · · ·
· · · · · · · · ·
0 microblog 5000 0 0 0 0 0 · · ·
Notes: we label the “marketing” microblogs as 1 and “non-marketing” ones as 0.
Given that the classification task in our case belongs to supervised
learning, we perform the following steps. First, we choose four ma-
chine learning algorithms to classify separately the microblogs, including
logistic regression (logit), decision tree14 (CART), random forest (Rnd-
For) and multinomial naive bayes (MNB)15. The first two algorithms re-
quire that only few features can be introduced into the model. To reduce
the dimension, we perform the truncated singular vector decomposition
(TSVD) method (Manning and Schutze., 2008). Then we select the main
features extracted by TSVD in the two algorithms.16 When using RndFor
and MNB algorithms, we directly use the TF-IDF matrix as inputs.
Second, we randomly select 4,000 out of the 5,000 labelled microblogs
as the training set and the rest 1,000 microblogs as the test set. Since the
algorithms logit, CART and RndFor require us to determine the param-
eters, we apply a cross-validation method17 to optimize them. Using a
14We use the GINI criterion in the splitting decision.
15See the details of the four algorithms in Baesens (2014); Baesens et al. (2015).
16In logit, we further apply the recursive feature selection to remove several less impor-
tant features.
17See the details in James et al. (2014).
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10-fold cross-validation approach, we randomly divide the training set
into 10 groups of equal size. Each time we use a given algorithm to fit 9
folds and evaluate its performance on the rest 1 fold, which is the vali-
dation set. The evaluation is based on the area under the receiver operating
characteristics curve (AUC) score, which is the most informative and ob-
jective indicator of predictive accuracy within a benchmarking context
(Lessmann et al., 2008). This procedure is repeated 10 times and each
time a different group of observations is treated as the validation set. For
each set of parameters, we compute the average of the 10 AUC scores.
Then we compare the average AUC score of different parameter settings
and select the best performing set of parameters. We adopt the parame-
ters’ values suggested in Lessmann et al. (2008)18, and the ones with the
best average AUC score of each algorithm are listed in Table 46.
Table 46: Best Performing Parameters in the 10-fold Cross Validation
No. components No. features selected No. trees AUC train average
logit 19 14 0.843
CART 20 20 0.758
RndFor 250 0.943
MNB 0.941
Finally, after we determine the parameters for each algorithm, we as-
sess their performance on the test set. The AUC scores of the four al-
gorithms are listed in Table 47. To further understand which algorithm
has a statistically significant better performance, we conduct the test in
DeLong et al. (1988). From Table 47 we can find that RndFor and MNB
are significantly better than logit and CART. But there is no significant
difference between RndFor and MNB. Since MNB has the largest AUC
value on the test set, we adopt it to classify all the rest microblogs.
18The parameters’ values suggested in Lessmann et al. (2008) for each classifier are as
follows: for logit and CART, we first perform dimension reduction to extract the k main
components where k varies from 5 to 20. The 5 main components explain 23.0% of the
variance while the 20 main components explain 28.9%. In logit we further perform the
recursive feature elimination to select the inputs in the regression model and the number
of features selected varies from 5 to k. As for RndFor, the parameter to be tuned is the
number of trees, and the suggested values include [10, 50, 100, 250, 500, 1,000].
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Table 47: DeLong’s Test to Compare Different Models’ AUC Scores
AUC test logit CART RndFor MNB
logit 0.854
CART 0.765 0.000
RndFor 0.956 0.000 0.000
MNB 0.960 0.000 0.000 0.496
Notes: Except the AUC scores, the above listed numbers are p-values.
4.3.3 Modelling and Data
After we classify all the microblogs, we aggregate the data by seller
and thus obtain the number of marketing-related microblogs each seller
posts in each observation period. Then we compute the proportion of
the number of marketing microblogs to the total number of microblogs,
which is used to measure marketing aggressiveness. We also count the
average number of likes per marketing microblog for each seller, which is
used to measure marketing popularity. The sellers whose average num-
ber of likes located in the 1% tail of the distribution are excluded from the
sample in order to reduce the possible outlier effect. Furthermore, we re-
move the sellers who posted less than 10 microblogs in each observation
period since the possible wrong classification may cause a large error on
the value of marketing proportion for sellers who post less. The details
of the data in each of the previous steps are presented in Table 48.
Table 48: Statistics by Data Processing Steps
Data of 2014
Steps No. sellers No. microblogs No. marketing microblogs marketing proportion
1. Initial sample 52,187 465,812 152,772 32.8%
2. sellers who post 18,809 465,812 152,772 32.8%
3. sellers who market 9,577 402,533 152,772 38.0%
4. final sample* 5,809 385,911 145,328 37.7%
Data of 2016
Steps No. sellers No. microblogs No. marketing microblogs marketing proportion
1. Initial sample 12,744 308,617 86,115 27.9%
2. sellers who post 4,227 308,617 86,115 27.9%
3. sellers who market 2,262 217,806 86,115 39.5%
4. final sample* 1,812 212,717 84,724 39.8%
* In the final sample we remove the outliers and sellers who post less than 10 microblogs.
90
In the final sample, the response variable is the average number of
likes a seller receives per marketing microblog. The inputs include the
marketing aggressiveness, the number of followers, gender, whether the
seller has the “V” and the “Tao” identities. For the data of 2016, we
manage to extract the average number of pictures a seller posts in each
marketing-related microblog as well. The definitions of the variables
are shown in Table 49 and their descriptive statistics are shown in Table
50. On average, a seller receives correspondingly 0.604 and 0.641 likes
per marketing microblog in 2014 and 2016. The standard deviation of
the variable in the two data sets are also quite close, which are respec-
tively 1.107 and 1.150. The average proportion of marketing microblogs
is 33.3% for the data of 2014 and 28.5% for 2016.
Table 49: Variable Definitions
Variables Definitions
likes average marketing The average number of likes received from all the marketing-related
microblogs.
marketing proportion The proportion of the number of marketing-related microblogs to the
total number of microblogs.
Tao 1 if the seller has a verified “Tao” identity; otherwise 0.
V 1 if the seller’s real identity has been verified; otherwise 0.
female 1 if the seller is a female; otherwise 0.
No. followers The number of followers the seller has.
No. pic The average number of pictures the seller posts per marketing-related
microblog.
To have a preliminary understanding of the relationship between a
Taobao seller’s marketing aggressiveness level and marketing popular-
ity, we divide the proportion of marketing microblogs into 5 intervals
uniformly. From Table 51 we can find that for both the data of 2014 and
2016, posting 20%-40% microblogs on marketing gains the largest aver-
age number of likes whereas posting 80% to 100% microblogs on market-
ing has the smallest. When the marketing aggressiveness level is beyond
40%, the average marketing popularity decreases. From these facts we
gain the impression that a seller’s marketing popularity and marketing
aggressiveness level have an inverted U-shape relationship, and market-
ing popularity is maximized when 20% to 40% of her microblogs are fo-
cused on marketing.
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Table 50: Summary Statistics
Data of 2014
Variables N mean sd min max
likes average marketing 5,809 0.604 1.107 0 7.25
marketing proportion 5,809 0.333 0.302 0.0034 1
female 5,809 0.759 0.428 0 1
No. followers 5,809 9,830 46,553 1 1,011,968
Tao 5,809 0.583 0.493 0 1
V 5,809 0.209 0.407 0 1
Data of 2016
Variables N mean sd min max
likes average marketing 1,812 0.641 1.150 0 5
marketing proportion 1,812 0.285 0.292 0.0009 1
female 1,812 0.829 0.376 0 1
followers 1,812 14,613 83,851 4 1,866,129
Tao 1,812 0.512 0.500 0 1
V 1,812 0.221 0.415 0 1
No. pic 1,812 3.804 2.790 0 9
Table 51: Marketing Popularity by Marketing Aggressiveness Level
Data of 2014 Data of 2016
Proportion Mean Std. Dev. Freq. Mean Std. Dev. Freq.
(0, 0.2] 0.618 1.180 2736 0.543 1.078 976
(0.2, 0.4] 0.846 1.313 1078 1.022 1.427 320
(0.4, 0.6] 0.669 1.054 703 0.943 1.316 195
(0.6, 0.8] 0.467 0.793 565 0.521 0.916 143
(0.8, 1] 0.234 0.451 727 0.258 0.556 178
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We then perform linear regression, multi-layer perceptron neural net-
work (MLP)19 and random forest to explore the relation between the pro-
portion of marketing microblogs and the average number of likes. In
the linear regression, we add the squared term of the marketing propor-
tion to test Hypothesis 1. Moreover, since some inputs may have a non-
linear effect on the response variable, we follow the steps introduced in
Van Gestel et al. (2006, 2005) to perform the Yeo Johnson transformation
(Yeo and Johnson, 2000) for the continuous variables in the linear regres-
sion (see details in Appendix 4.6.3). In MLP and RndFor, we use 5-fold
cross-validation to select the parameters with the best performance.20
4.4 Results and Discussion
Two-thirds of each data set of the two years are randomly selected
to train the algorithms and the rest one-third are used to test their per-
formance. We evaluate their performance based on three indicators: R-
square, mean square error (MSE) and Pearson correlation coefficient be-
tween the predicted value and the true value. As Table 52 shows, the
linear regression using Yeo Johnson transformation21 has the best perfor-
mance compared with the standard linear regression, MLP22 and Rnd-
For23.
Table 53 presents the estimation results of the linear regression using
Yeo-Johnson Transformation. We notice that the coefficients of marketing
proportion and its quadratic term are both significant, and as expected,
the coefficients of the quadratic term are negative for both data sets. To
confirm that the relation is an inverted U-shape, we further perform the
19See the details in Baesens et al. (2015).
20Lessmann et al. (2008) assume that there is a single hidden layer for MLP and the pa-
rameters’ values of the number of neurons are [4,5,6]. As for RndFor, the number of trees
are seleced from [10, 50, 100, 250, 500, 1,000].
21We perform the Yeo Johnson transformation for all the continuous variables, but only
the transformation of the number of followers significantly improves the performance of
the model. The estimated parameters for the number of followers are λ = −2, c = −0.5
for the data of 2014 and λ = −2, c = 0 for data of 2016.
22In MLP, the optimal number of neurons is 4 for both the data of 2014 and 2016.
23In RndFor, the optimal number of trees is 250 for the data of 2014 and 1000 for 2016.
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Table 52: Performance of Different Models on Test Set
2014 2016
Models R2 MSE Pearson R2 MSE Pearson
Linear Regression 0.081 1.085 0.298 0.220 1.039 0.469
Yeo Johnsson 0.247 0.889 0.498 0.369 0.841 0.608
MLP 0.038 1.136 0.230 0.111 1.184 0.341
RndFor 0.134 1.023 0.421 0.308 0.922 0.560
Table 53: Regression Results of Yeo-Johnson Transformation (Training Set)
VARIABLES 2014 2016
marketing proportion 0.567*** 1.185***
(0.189) (0.315)
marketing proportion2 -1.021*** -1.623***
(0.183) (0.313)
V 0.0157 0.0133
(0.0483) (0.0755)
Tao 0.0271 -0.0786
(0.0324) (0.0546)
(transformed)No. followers 1.296*** 6.204***
(0.0715) (0.404)
female 0.272*** 0.0310
(0.0357) (0.0640)
No.pic 0.0418***
(0.0105)
Constant 1.488*** 0.159**
(0.0851) (0.0762)
Observations 3,872 1,208
R-squared 0.241 0.359
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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test in Lind and Mehlum (2010) (see details in Appendix 4.6.4). Table 54
shows that in both data, the slope at the lower bound of the data range
is significant and positive and the slope at the upper bound is significant
and negative. Moreover, the turning points are respectively 0.278 and
0.365, and their 95% confidence intervals are respectively [0.146, 0.346]
and [0.272, 0.416], which are located in the data range (0, 1]. Thus, we can
confirm that there is an inverted U-shape relationship between the aver-
age number of likes and the proportion of marketing-related microblogs.
Figure 17 and Figure 18 show their relationship.24 The results imply that
when the proportion of marketing-related microblogs increases under a
certain level, people are inclined to like them more since they convey the
information about the products. However, if the proportion continues to
increase beyond a certain level, people may get annoyed of their market-
ing behaviour.
Table 54: Inverted U-shape Test
2014 2016
Lower bound Upper bound Lower bound Upper bound
Interval 0.003 1 0.001 1
Slope 0.560 -1.474 1.182 -2.060
t-value 2.985 -7.939 3.761 -6.304
P > |t| 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
Overall test t-value: 2.98 t-value: 3.76
P > |t|: 0.001 P > |t|: 0.000
Turning point 0.278 0.365
95% CI [0.146, 0.346] [0.272, 0.416]
We make some further robustness checks by performing other spec-
ifications such as using the cubic, logarithm and exponential forms of
the marketing proportion. As Table 55 shows, the performance of these
specifications are almost the same. Though we cannot exclude other
possibilities, what we empirically find is that when the proportion of
marketing-related microblogs goes beyond a certain level, sellers receive
fewer likes from their followers.
24In the graphs, the average numer of likes are computed given the mean value of the
transformed number of followers and the number of pictures, and female equal to 1 for the
data of 2014. The variables that are not significant are ignored in the calculation.
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Figure 17: Optimal Proportion 2014
Figure 18: Optimal Proportion 2016
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More interestingly, we notice that the non-linear transformation of
the number of followers significantly improves the prediction accuracy
of the number of likes. The relationship between the number of likes
and followers of the two years data is depicted in Figure 19 and Figure
20.25 It can be seen that an increase of 10,000 followers from 10,000 to
20,000 has a much larger effect on the number of likes than an increase
from 100,000 to 110,000. After the number of followers reaches around
100,000, a saturation effect occurs.
Figure 19: Likes and Followers 2014
4.5 Conclusion and Extension
In this chapter, we empirically investigate the relationship between
sellers’ marketing aggressiveness level and their marketing popularity
in social media. In particular, by analysing the microblogs of Taobao
sellers on Sina Weibo, we find that the relationship between the propor-
25In the graphs, the average numer of likes are computed given the mean value of the
number of pictures, the proportion of marketing microblogs is equal to 0.3, and female
equal to 1 for the data of 2014. The variables that are not significant are ignored in the
calculation.
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Figure 20: Likes and Followers 2016
tion of marketing-related microblogs and the average number of likes a
seller receives per marketing microblog can be depicted as an inverted
U-shaped curve. The results imply that when a seller is too aggressive
in marketing on social media, she will receive fewer likes as feedback.
Specifically, the optimal proportion of marketing microblogs is around
0.3.
Our contribution to the literature of social media marketing is at least
twofold. First, we perform a quantitative analysis of the relationship
between the level of marketing aggressiveness and the marketing pop-
ularity, and obtain a limited range of empirical optimal marketing ag-
gressiveness level to maximize the marketing popularity. Second, our
research presents a first attempt to study the C2C sellers’ marketing be-
haviour in social media by collecting and analysing a unique data set.
We also employ the text mining techniques to explore a huge amount of
microblogs.
In our future work we will investigate the impact of social media
marketing on the C2C sellers’ sales by collecting data from both Taobao
and SinaWeibo. Although the popularity on social media can reflect to a
certain extent the purchasing intention of customers, it is not clear how
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much the popularity is finally converted into sales. If the popularity is
highly correlated with the sales, then we must highlight the importance
of the marketing behaviour on social media and provide better strate-
gies for the sellers. Moreover, by incorporating popularity in the fore-
cast of sales, sellers can manage their operations better and thus improve
profit margin. If there is no significant correlation between popularity
and sales, the sellers have to decide whether to continue the investment
on the current marketing channel.
Besides the microblogs data we have already analysed in the present
work, we have also collected from the Taobao website the data of the
12,744 Taobao sellers from August to November, 2016. As shown in Fig-
ure 21, the variables include monthly sales, credit level, scores of service
quality, category of products, whether they have a guarantee policy, shop
age and region, etc. Considering that the marketing popularity of mi-
croblogs has an influence on sales but is also affected by other features
such as number of followers, marketing aggressiveness level and so on,
we plan to use the structural equation modelling in the future analysis.
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Figure 21: Framework of the Study on Taobao and Weibo
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4.6 Appendix
4.6.1 Illustration of Profile Page
Figure 22: An Example of a Taobao Seller’s Sina Weibo Account
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4.6.2 Variants of “Taobao Sellers” in Chinese
Figure 23: Variants of “Taobao Sellers” in Chinese
4.6.3 Estimation of Yeo-Johnson Transformation
Yeo and Johnson (2000) has proposed a transformation which is of
the same form as Box-Cox transformations and is also valid for negative
values. The transformation function is defined as follows:
f(x;λ) =

((1 + x)λ − 1)/λ, λ 6= 0, x ≥ 0,
log(x+ 1), λ = 0, x ≥ 0,
− ((1− x)(2−λ) − 1)/(2− λ), λ 6= 2, x ≤ 0,
− log(−x+ 1), λ = 2, x ≤ 0.
We consider the following transformation: x 7→ f(x + c, λ) where
c is the location parameter and λ is the transformation parameter. The
parameters c and λ are estimated based on the following steps:
Step 1: The variable to be transformed is first normalized to zero me-
dian and unit variance.
Step 2: The parameters are estimated using a grid search mechanism.
The parameter c varies from −3 to +3 and the parameter λ varies from
−2 to +2. For each parameter combination (c, λ), the model is estimated
and MSE is stored.
Step 3: Using a 5-fold cross-validation, the combination (c, λ) with
the lowest average MSE is selected. The optimal MSE is compared with
the MSE obtained with λ = 1. When the MSE of the nonlinear model is
lower than the MSE of the linear model, the nonlinear transformation is
applied.
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4.6.4 Test of the Inverted U-shape
Y = β0 + β1X + β2X
2 + γ
′
Z + 
Haans et al. (2015) framed the U-shape test proposed in Lind and Mehlum
(2010) as a three-step procedure. Here we list the steps to test whether
the relationship between Y and X is an inverted U-shape:
Step 1: β2 needs to be significant and negative.
Step 2: The slope must be significantly steep at both ends of the data
range [Xl, Xu], where Xl is the minimal of X and Xu is the maximal. To
make sure that the inverted U-shape is a phenomenon in the interior of
the range ofX , the slope at the lower bound β1+2β2Xl should be signifi-
cant and positive and the slope at the upper bound β1+2β2Xu should be
significant and negative. Hence, we need to test whether the combined
null hypothesis can be rejected in favour of the alternative hypothesis:
H0 : β1 + 2β2Xl ≤ 0 and/or β1 + 2β2Xu ≥ 0
H1 : β1 + 2β2Xl > 0 and β1 + 2β2Xu < 0
Sasabuchi (1980) provides a test based on the likelihood ratio princi-
ple. The rejection areas are as follows:
Rα{(β1, β2) : β1 + 2β2Xl√
s11 + 4Xls12 + 4X
2
l s22
> tα&
β1 + β22Xu√
s11 + 4Xus12 + 4X2us22
< −tα}
where s11, s22, s12 are the estimated variance of β1 and β2 and their
covariance, and tα is the α percentile of the t-distribution with the ap-
propriate degree of freedom.
Step 3: The turning point and its 95% confidence interval needs to be
located within the range of X . The point estimate of the turning point is
X = − β22β1 . Fieller (1954) provides how to construct a confidence interval
for the ratio of two normally distributed estimates. The lower bound and
upper bound of the (1−2α) confidence interval for− β22β1 are respectively
X˜l =
s12t
2
α − β1β2 − tα
√
(s212 − s22s11)t2α + β22s11 + β21s22 − 2s12β1β2
β22 − s22t2α
X˜u =
s12t
2
α − β1β2 + tα
√
(s212 − s22s11)t2α + β22s11 + β21s22 − 2s12β1β2
β22 − s22t2α
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If the confidence interval is located within the range of X , we can make
sure that the relationship between Y and X is an inverted U-shape.
4.6.5 Other Specifications of Linear Regression
Figure 24: Cubic Specification 2014
4.6.6 Classification Using a Dictionary Approach and the
Regression Results
We also adopt a dictionary approach in classifying the microblogs for
the data of 2014. After we have collected the 465,812 microblogs, we seg-
ment each of them into a list of words, disregarding grammar and word
order. Then we count the frequency of all the words and rank them.
Starting from the most frequent words, we manually select the top 50
words related to marketing and use them as a dictionary (see Figure 30).
We define a microblog is related to marketing if it contains at least one
word in the dictionary, otherwise it is non-marketing. As a robustness
check, we also create another dictionary using the top 100 words related
to marketing (see Figure 31). The dictionary approach is relatively more
rough than the machine learning algorithms in classification. Compared
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Table 55: Other Specifications of Linear Regression
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Figure 25: Cubic Specification 2016
Figure 26: Exponential Specification 2014
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Figure 27: Exponential Specification 2016
with MNB, it results in less microblogs classified as marketing (see de-
tails in Table 48 and Table 56).
We use a simple linear regression to explore the relation between the
marketing aggressiveness level and the marketing popularity. Similarly,
we add the squared term of the marketing proportion to test Hypothesis.
Instead of performing the Yeo Johnson transformation, we simply use
the logarithm form of the number of followers. The regression results are
shown in Table 58. We notice that the coefficient of marketing proportion
and its quadratic term are both significant. As expected, the coefficient of
the quadratic term is negative in both specifications, using respectively
the two dictionaries in the classification of microblogs. Moreover, the
average number of likes is maximized when the proportion of market-
ing microblogs is respectively 37.9% and 36.9%. The relationships be-
tween the marketing popularity and marketing aggressiveness level of
the two specifications are respectively displayed in Figure 28 and Fig-
ure 29, which is similar to the previous ones. Hence, the results of the
dictionary approach further support our hypothesis.
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Table 56: Statistics by Data Processing Steps
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Table 57: Correlation Matrix
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Table 58: Regression Results Using the Dictionary Approach
VARIABLES Dictionary 50 Dictionary 100
marketing proportion 1.073*** 0.975***
(0.147) (0.152)
marketing proportion2 -1.414*** -1.320***
(0.156) (0.157)
logNo. followers 0.245*** 0.254***
(0.00920) (0.00953)
Tao 0.0183 -0.00139
(0.0241) (0.0246)
V 0.0562 0.0671*
(0.0360) (0.0369)
female 0.219*** 0.222***
(0.0273) (0.0277)
Constant -1.460*** -1.480***
(0.0647) (0.0653)
Observations 6,215 6,424
R-squared 0.214 0.212
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Figure 28: The Relationship between Likes and Followers Using the Dictio-
nary of 50 Words
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Figure 29: The Relationship between Likes and Followers Using the Dictio-
nary of 100 Words
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Figure 30: The 50 Most Frequent Words Related to Marketing in the Data of
2014
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Figure 31: The 100 Most Frequent Words Related to Marketing in the Data
of 2014
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
The dissertation exploits large datasets in the context of business net-
works and applies extensive data analysis and computation tools. In
particular, we employ econometric models, novel network measures and
machine learning algorithms in global inter-firm ownership network and
Chinese social media data.
In Chapters 2 and 3 we empirically investigate the link between a
firm’s performance and its network position within international busi-
ness groups using the data on Italian firms. In Chapter 2, we find a posi-
tive relationship between firm centrality and performance in small busi-
ness groups. Moreover, we provide evidence that the group size ”pre-
mium” for the peripheral firms is larger than for the central ones. Our
contribution to the literature on ownership network of business group is
twofold. First, we provide a new measure of centrality, which reduces
the high degree of collinearity between component size and traditional
measures such as harmonic centrality and ownership level. Our measure
makes centrality more comparable across components of different sizes.
Second, we discuss the role of a firm’s network position in the group on
its performance by providing a more detailed analysis of its interaction
with business group size, which is underexploited in the literature on
organizational network.
In Chapter 3, we investigate the benefit of foreign ownership to do-
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mestic firms from diverse perspectives. Our findings reveal that the Ital-
ian subsidiaries owned by foreign direct owners are more productive
than domestic direct owners. Furthermore, we notice that the Italian
subsidiaries with shorter organizational or geographical distance from
their foreign owners are more productive. In addition, subsidiaries with
multiple cross-border links in the upstream ownership chain are found
to have a higher productivity. From the results we gain a deeper insight
into the role of a firm’s position and foreign ownership in the business
group on its performance.
In Chapter 4, we discuss C2C business in social media. Thanks to the
collaboration between China’s largest C2C e-commerce platform Taobao
and China’s largest microblogging platform Sina Weibo, we are able to
identify the C2C sellers in social media and analyse their marketing be-
haviour over microblogs. We explore how aggressive the sellers should
be when promoting their products over Sina Weibo. Interestingly, we
find an inverted U-shape between marketing popularity and marketing
aggressiveness level, and the optimal proportion of marketing-related
contents is around 30%. To the best of our knowledge, this chapter is
the first empirical work to provide an optimal marketing level in the lit-
erature of social media marketing. In addition, our research presents a
first attempt to study the C2C sellers’ marketing behaviour in social me-
dia by collecting and analysing this unique data set. Since we have also
collected the sellers’ sales data, we will investigate the impact of their
features and behaviour in social media on their sales performance in our
future work. By incorporating these features in the forecast of sales, sell-
ers can manage their operations better and thus improve profit margin.
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